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I. INTRODUCTION 
Drawing upon the burgeoning field of therapeutic jurisprudence, 
this Article analyzes the psychological consequences of estate planning. 
This analysis reveals that the preparation and implementation of an estate 
plan through the execution of a will and other estate-planning documents 
has both therapeutic and antitherapeutic characteristics.1 This analysis 
also suggests that the positive and negative psychological consequences 
of estate planning can serve as a framework through which to analyze the 
law of succession and which can provide fresh perspectives on a diverse 
array of estate-planning issues. Because legal scholars have generally 
failed to employ therapeutic jurisprudential analysis in the estate-
planning context,2 this Article illuminates the field’s analytical relevance 
to the study of estate planning and encourages the broad expansion of 
therapeutic jurisprudential analysis to other areas of the law of succes-
sion. 
To illustrate the field’s overlooked analytical potential with respect 
to the law of succession, this Article analyzes the therapeutic implica-
tions of a set of focused and discrete estate-planning rules, namely the 
law governing the wills of soldiers and sailors. This analysis confirms the 
viability of therapeutic jurisprudence as an insightful analytical tool with 
respect to not only the law governing military wills but also the estate-
planning process generally.3 Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that the 
therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate planning can ultimately 
reveal new areas of reform throughout the law of succession. 
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 1. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 2. See infra Part II.C. 
 3. See, e.g., infra Part V. 
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Although legal scholars have not previously analyzed the estate-
planning process from a therapeutic jurisprudential perspective,4 the the-
rapeutic potential of preparing for the disposition of one’s property upon 
death is both intuitive and familiar. For instance, in his classic novel Mo-
by-Dick, Herman Melville provides a striking example of the psycholog-
ical consequences of finalizing an estate plan. Not long into Captain 
Ahab’s search for the Great White Whale, one of the Pequod’s longboats 
is attacked while in pursuit of a pod of sperm whales.5 As Melville’s nar-
rator Ishmael describes: “Then all in one welded commotion came an 
invisible push from astern, while forward the boat seemed striking on a 
ledge; the sail collapsed and exploded; a gush of scalding vapor shot up 
near by; something rolled and tumbled like an earthquake beneath us.”6 
Although the sailors safely escape the immediate peril of the vengeful 
whale, they are “tossed helter-skelter into the white curdling cream of the 
squall.”7 They find themselves “drenched through, and shivering cold, 
despairing of ship or boat,”8 and are left adrift throughout the night. For-
tunately, as morning dawns, Ishmael and the other stranded sailors catch 
sight of their boat and eventually reunite with the Pequod.9 
After escaping the “jaws of death,”10 Ishmael reflects upon the pe-
rilous life a whaler leads, a life in which “squalls and capsizing in the 
water and the consequent bivouacks on the deep [are a] matter[] of com-
mon occurrence.”11 With these dangers in mind, Ishmael finds solace in 
the preparation of his estate plan. Instead of seeking camaraderie with his 
fellow crewmates, retiring to peaceful isolation in his quarters, or partak-
ing in any number of religious rituals, Ishmael first tends to the terms of 
his will.12 Upon ensuring that his testamentary wishes are in order, Ish-
mael describes his satisfaction: “After the ceremony was concluded upon 
the present occasion, I felt all the easier; a stone was rolled away from 
my heart.”13 
Ishmael’s account of his testamentary experience illustrates the in-
herent therapeutic potential of estate planning.14 Formalizing the intuition 
                                                            
 4. See infra Part II.C. 
 5. See HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK; OR THE WHALE 244 (Penguin Books 2003) (1851). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 245. 
 9. See id. at 245–47. 
 10. Id. at 245. 
 11. Id. at 248. 
 12. See id. at 248–49. 
 13. Id. at 249. 
 14. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The “Estate Planning” Counselor and Values Destroyed by Death, 
55 IOWA L. REV. 376, 382 (1969) (explaining that this “passage from Moby Dick . . . seems to illu-
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underlying Melville’s insight, this Article uses therapeutic jurisprudence, 
which is founded on the idea “that the law itself can be seen to function 
as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent,”15 as an analytical tool to more 
deeply examine the therapeutic consequences of estate planning. When 
viewed within this framework, both negative and positive psychological 
consequences of preparing an estate plan are identifiable. For example, 
estate planning can impose a negative psychological toll because the 
process necessarily involves the recognition that the testator’s life will 
end.16 Less frequently acknowledged, however, are the positive psycho-
logical consequences of preparing an estate plan. These benefits are per-
haps most apparent in the satisfaction that the testator experiences from 
knowing that his desired testamentary scheme is legally memorialized 
and that his estate will be distributed according to his wishes.17 
The normative aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to shape the law 
in a way that maximizes its therapeutic potential without undermining 
the law’s fundamental purposes.18 This goal is especially relevant to the 
law of succession because of the acute psychological consequences and 
emotionally charged contexts of estate planning and the ultimate admin-
istration of the testator’s estate.19 Recognizing the often-overlooked re-
levance of therapeutic jurisprudence to the law of succession and seeking 
to inspire the widespread application of the discipline in the estate-
planning context, this Article examines the special rules governing the 
will-execution process of soldiers and sailors.20 Because this area of the 
law comprises a set of insulated and specialized rules, the application of 
therapeutic jurisprudence to the will-execution process of soldiers and 
                                                                                                                                     
strate [the] point” that “will-preparation actually reduces fear of death and has a constructive or even 
therapeutic effect on death anxiety”). 
 15. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 184, 185 (1997). 
 16. See Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-in Will Forms—The First Decade: Theoretical Con-
structs and Empirical Finding, 72 OR. L. REV. 769, 778 (1993) (“Many persons are intellectually 
aware that estate planning is necessary, but find it emotionally difficult to confront the fragility of 
life and health.”); The Limits to a Do-it-Yourself Will, CHANGING TIMES, Nov. 1984, at 82, 84 (ex-
plaining that “the first and perhaps biggest hurdle” to executing a will is “acknowledging your own 
mortality”). 
 17. See In re SRC Holding Corp., 364 B.R. 1, 34 (D. Minn. 2007) (explaining that one “bene-
fit” of creating a will is the “peace of mind” that the testator receives from “knowing that his/her 
wishes upon death [will] be carried out”); Nancy G. Henderson, Drafting Dispositive Provisions in 
Wills (pt. 1), 43 PRAC. LAW. 33, 33 (1997) (“[T]he main reason for having a will . . . is the peace of 
mind that comes from knowing that their assets will be distributed the way they want them to be 
distributed.”). 
 18. See Winick, supra note 15, at 184. 
 19. See infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
430 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:427 
sailors clearly illustrates the unique perspective that this Article’s 
framework can contribute to the analysis of the law of succession. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II provides an introduction 
to therapeutic jurisprudence. Parts III through V then apply therapeutic 
jurisprudence to the process of estate planning. Specifically, Part III 
identifies the antitherapeutic consequences of preparing an estate plan, 
and Part IV examines the positive psychological aspects of the estate-
planning process. Finally, Part V uses the therapeutic jurisprudential 
framework of estate planning that is developed in Parts III and IV to ana-
lyze a set of discrete estate-planning rules, namely the special rules go-
verning the execution of wills by soldiers and sailors. The analysis of the 
law governing this focused context illustrates how the therapeutic juri-
sprudential framework can serve as an analytical tool for a broad spec-
trum of legal rules governing the estate-planning process and the law of 
succession. 
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE LAW OF SUCCESSION 
A. The Emergence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
In recent years, therapeutic jurisprudence has emerged as a new 
lens through which to view and analyze the law. This analysis “focuses 
on the law’s impact on emotional life and on psychological well-
being.”21 As Professor David Wexler explains, the psychological effect 
of the law “has traditionally been ignored . . . or regarded as something 
apart from the law and its concern,”22 but therapeutic jurisprudence “hu-
maniz[es] the law” and inquires “whether the law can be made or applied 
in a more therapeutic way.”23 Professor Bruce Winick, who, along with 
Wexler, is a founder of the therapeutic jurisprudence movement, explains 
further that “[t]herapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law 
as a therapeutic agent.”24 
Since therapeutic jurisprudence emerged from mental-health-law 
scholarship roughly twenty years ago,25 scholars have used its framework 
to analyze numerous areas of the law, including various facets of crimi-
                                                            
 21. David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 125, 
125 (2000). 
 22. David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 TOURO L. REV. 353, 356 (2004). 
 23. See Wexler, supra note 21, at 125. 
 24. See Winick, supra note 15, at 185. 
 25. See Marilyn McMahon & David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Developments and 
Applications in Australia and New Zealand, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 1, 1 (2003); Winick, 
supra note 15, at 184. 
2012]  A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning 431 
nal and family law.26 The scope of therapeutic jurisprudence continues to 
expand, and its proponents suggest that its framework is relevant to the 
analysis of all areas of law.27 Indeed, proponents urge the extension of 
therapeutic jurisprudence beyond the realms of academia and law reform, 
and suggest that therapeutic jurisprudence should be a part of the tradi-
tional law school curriculum, the daily practice of law, and the legal cul-
ture generally.28 
B. The Mechanics of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis has two components. First, 
such analysis begins with the positive task of identifying the therapeutic 
and antitherapeutic consequences of the law.29 Second, the normative 
goal of therapeutic jurisprudence is to shape the law to maximize its the-
rapeutic qualities and minimize its negative psychological conse-
quences.30 This second component of the analysis involves proposing 
reforms of the legal system that will increase the law’s overall therapeu-
tic potential. Such proposals can include reforms of substantive doc-
trines, procedural rules, and the roles of various actors within the legal 
process (e.g., lawyers and judges).31 
Therapeutic jurisprudence acknowledges, however, that other fac-
tors warrant consideration in the debate over a particular law’s substance 
                                                            
 26. See Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement,” 6 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 11 (2006) (explaining that therapeutic jurisprudence has “spread into 
many . . . areas,” such as “sentencing and probation agreements, workers’ compensation law, sexual 
orientation law, disability law, fault-based tort compensation schemes, domestic violence, crime 
victims, mandatory child abuse reporting, contract law, and family law”). 
 27. See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Rediscovering Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Overlooked Areas of 
the Law—How Exposing Its Presence in the Environmental Justice Movement Can Legitimize the 
Paradigm and Make the Case for Its Inclusion into All Aspects of Legal Education and the Practice 
of Law, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 215, 218 (2008). 
 28. See Dennis P. Stolle, Introduction to PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xv, xvii 
(Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000). 
 29. See Wexler, supra note 21, at 125–26. 
 30. See Jason Schultz, Can Women Judges Help Make Civil Sexual Assault Trials More Thera-
peutic?, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 53, 54 (“The goals of therapeutic jurisprudence analysis vary by 
project and protagonist, but generally, most advocates . . . attempt to evaluate and redesign legal 
systems so as to provide the participants with the most positive experience . . . .”). 
 31. See Wexler, supra note 21, at 126; see also Murry Levine, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Analysis of Mandated Reporting of Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. 
RTS. 711, 713 (1993) (using therapeutic jurisprudence to examine “the impact of the mandate to 
report suspected child maltreatment on the psychotherapy relationship”); Jennifer Marie Sanchez, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Due Process in the Juvenile Parole Revocation Process: An Arizona 
Illustration, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 111, 112 (2005) (exploring “the use of [therapeutic jurispru-
dence] principles to reform the parole revocation process of the Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections”); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 279, 283 (1994) (using therapeutic jurisprudence to analyze “the role of the judge” in 
criminal courts). 
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and application.32 In fact, “Wexler and Winick have repeatedly empha-
sized that therapeutic jurisprudence does not dictate the more therapeutic 
outcome.”33 Instead, therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that therapeutic 
consequences should be evaluated alongside other considerations when 
analyzing the costs and benefits of the law. Accordingly, the normative 
foundation of therapeutic jurisprudence is not that therapeutic conse-
quences should be elevated to such an extent that other considerations 
are ignored, but instead is that, all else being equal, the law should be 
shaped to maximize its therapeutic potential. 
C. Therapeutic Jurisprudential Analysis of the Law of Succession 
Despite therapeutic jurisprudence’s broad expansion and the intui-
tiveness of estate planning’s therapeutic potential⎯which Melville rec-
ognized more than a century and a half ago⎯the application of therapeu-
tic jurisprudence to the study of the law of succession has been limited.34 
This is true even though maximizing the law’s therapeutic potential in 
the context of succession is a prudent objective given the emotionally 
charged nature of the estate-planning and probate processes.35 Nonethe-
less, limited examples of the application of therapeutic jurisprudence to 
the law of succession can be found.36 
For example, one commentator has examined the law governing the 
personal representative who supervises the distribution of the testator’s 
estate. The author began the analysis by identifying the therapeutic and 
antitherapeutic effects of the personal representative’s actions on the tes-
tator’s family.37 Based on this therapeutic jurisprudential analysis, the 
author proposed the implementation of a mediation system to the probate 
process, which she argued would reduce some of the “bitter feelings” 
                                                            
 32. See Schultz, supra note 30, at 54 (listing other factors, such as “constitutionality, individual 
autonomy, integrity of the fact-finding process, and community safety”). 
 33. Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 193, 211 (1995); see also, David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Juri-
sprudence: Breaking the Bounds of Conventional Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L SCH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 759, 762 (1993). 
 34. See Patricia Monroe Wisnom, Note, Probate Law and Mediation: A Therapeutic Perspec-
tive, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1345, 1354 (1995). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See, e.g., Pamela R. Champine, A Sanist Will?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 547, 560–62 
(2002–2003) (providing a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of testamentary capacity); Dara Green, 
Note & Comment, Antemortem Probate: A Mediation Model, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 663, 680 
(1999); Wisnom, supra note 34, at 1345. 
 37. See Wisnom, supra note 34, at 1356–57 (explaining that “the laws . . . set forth in the Ari-
zona probate code regarding the duties of the personal representative . . . may be considered thera-
peutic” because “they set forth guidelines that . . . generally result in timely and accurate distribu-
tions in accordance with the wishes of the decedent”). 
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experienced “at the closure of difficult estates.”38 This study of the per-
sonal representative’s role in the probate process provides a rare example 
of a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of the law of succession. 
In addition to the few explicit applications of therapeutic jurispru-
dence to the law of succession, some legal scholars have examined the 
psychological consequences of estate planning and will-execution within 
a less structured framework.39 The work of Professor Thomas Shaffer is 
the most comprehensive of this scholarship. Although Shaffer does not 
expressly frame his work within a therapeutic jurisprudential context, his 
scholarship contains many of the hallmarks of the discipline. For exam-
ple, Shaffer has examined the psychological consequences of the testa-
tor’s confrontation with death and ultimately suggested ways that the 
estate-planning attorney can more effectively address the negative psy-
chological consequences of the testamentary experience.40 Supplement-
ing Shaffer’s scholarly analysis and adding to the sparse literature that 
explicitly applies therapeutic jurisprudence to the law of succession, this 
Article examines the estate-planning process within a therapeutic juri-
sprudential framework. 
III. ANTITHERAPEUTIC CONSEQUENCES OF ESTATE PLANNING 
The first step of a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis is to identify 
the negative and positive psychological consequences of the law.41 This 
process facilitates the second step of the analysis by providing a frame-
work through which to evaluate the therapeutic impact of potential law 
reforms.42 When applied to the process of estate planning, the first step 
of a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis reveals that the exercise of tes-
tamentary power has both antitherapeutic and therapeutic consequences. 
Indeed, in contrast to Ishmael, who seemingly experienced only the the-
rapeutic effects of estate planning,43 some may experience negative psy-
chological consequences from the act of preparing and implementing a 
testamentary scheme. 
                                                            
 38. Id. at 1362. 
 39. See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony—History, Significance, and Strat-
egies, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 413, 419–20 (1988). Other scholars have merely mentioned the psycholog-
ical consequences of various aspects of the law of succession in passing. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, 
Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 
1047 (2004) (“Executing a will can yield obvious psychic benefits . . . .”). 
 40. See generally Shaffer, supra note 14; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Will Interviews, Young 
Family Clients and the Psychology of Testation, 44 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345 (1968). 
 41. See supra Part II.B. 
 42. See supra Part II.B. 
 43. See MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 249. 
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A. Death Anxiety 
The preparation and implementation of an estate plan can be psy-
chologically damaging because the testator must confront the inevitabili-
ty of death. While aboard the Pequod, Ishmael needed no reminder of 
life’s fragility. But for many people, estate planning is one of the few 
tasks that require direct consideration of their own mortality. Indeed, for 
most individuals, contemplating one’s death is difficult and unpleasant,44 
and may evoke severe negative emotions, such as fear, anxiety, and even 
terror.45 While the severity of these antitherapeutic consequences va-
ries,46 all testators are susceptible to some degree of death anxiety be-
cause the confrontation with death is inherent to the estate-planning 
process.47 A wide array of unique concerns may produce a particular tes-
tator’s anxiety, which likely vary depending on each testator’s distinct 
situation.48 Because a multitude of considerations—including “personal 
circumstances of age, wealth, family, personality, [and] attitude toward 
death,”—affect each testator’s decision to exercise testamentary power,49 
these same characteristics may likewise affect the nature and severity of 
the testator’s death anxiety. 
Although the sources of death anxiety vary, psychologists have 
identified seven general concerns that cause people to fear death: 
                                                            
 44. See Beyer, supra note 39, at 419; Charles I. Nelson & Jeanne M. Starck, Formalities and 
Formalism: A Critical Look at the Execution of Wills, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 331, 348 (1979) (explaining 
that “facing the reality of death and its attendant consequences is one of the most difficult responsi-
bilities in life”); Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377 (“[D]eath is an unpleasant fact to modern man.”). 
 45. See ROBERT FIRESTONE & JOYCE CATLETT, BEYOND DEATH ANXIETY xi (2009) (explain-
ing that sadness, anger, and fear are the appropriate emotions caused by facing one’s mortality); Eric 
Strachan et al., Coping with the Inevitability of Death: Terror Management and Mismanagement, in 
COPING WITH STRESS: EFFECTIVE PEOPLE AND PROCESS 120 (2001) (explaining that because 
“[h]umans are self-conscious and capable of infinite abstraction . . . we are aware of the inevitability 
of death, which is terrifying for an animal born with an innate desire for continued life,” and adding 
that “[d]eath . . . is unknown, which is terrifying”). 
 46. See ROBERT KASTENBAUM, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEATH 130 (3d ed. 2000) (“There are 
some weak indication that people in favorable socioeconomic circumstances report relatively lower 
levels of death anxiety.”); Rebecca Helen Lehto & Karen Farchaus Stein, Death Anxiety: An Analy-
sis of an Evolving Concept, 23 RES. & THEORY FOR NURSING PRAC. 23, 31–32 (2009) (“[D]eath 
anxiety is a multidimensional construct related to fear of and anxiety related to the anticipation and 
awareness of the reality of dying and death that includes emotional, cognitive, and motivational 
components that vary by developmental stage and sociocultural life occurrences.”). 
 47. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377 (explaining that “[t]he testamentary experience” is “ta-
boo-defying,” and that “[p]eople going through . . . [t]aboo-defying experiences . . . tend to be up-
set”); see also Lehto & Stein, supra note 46, at 24 (“Confronting death and the anxiety generated by 
knowledge of its inevitability is a universal psychological quandary for humans.”). 
 48. See In re Trusteeship Agreement with Nash, 122 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn. 1963) (noting 
that “every testator’s circumstances and plan of disposition is unique”); Pamela R. Champine, My 
Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 453 
(2001) (“[T]hose who leave wills” have “unique circumstances.”). 
 49. Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L. REV. 630, 652 (1992). 
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(1) they can no longer have any life experiences; 
(2) they may be uncertain as to what will happen to them if there is 
a life after death; 
(3) they may be afraid of what will happen to their bodies after 
death; 
(4) they realize they will no longer be able to care for their depen-
dants; 
(5) they realize that their death will cause grief to their relatives and 
friends; 
(6) they realize that all their plans and projects will come to an end; 
and 
(7) they may be afraid that the process of dying will be painful.50 
Studies analyzing these considerations in the context of estate plan-
ning suggest that many testators are burdened by the same worries during 
the preparation of a testamentary scheme and the exercise of testamenta-
ry power.51 Moreover, the anxiety of no longer providing for the needs of 
one’s family and the realization that one’s life work will come to an end 
are of particular concern for many testators.52 
Death anxiety’s potential severity is evident in the effort that many 
people expend to avoid activities that require consideration of death.53 
Indeed, “most [people] prefer to remain oblivious to the angel of death 
resting on [their] shoulders,”54 and as a result, many ignore their own 
mortality.55 For example, a relatively small number of adults opt into 
organ-donor programs, despite a large percentage of the public approving 
of organ donation.56 A variety of explanations for this phenomenon have 
                                                            
 50. Beyer, supra note 39, 419–20. 
 51. See, e.g., id.; Shaffer, supra note 14, at 378–79. 
 52. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 
985 (1987). 
 53. See Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 584 (2003) 
(“[P]eople delay beginning estate tax liability reduction activities” because “such activities require 
contemplating one’s own death.”); Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests? The Distribu-
tive and Welfare Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 STAN. L. REV. 641, 654 (1999) (“One also 
suspects that many people feel a strong aversion to annuitizing their wealth, arising in part from an 
unwillingness to face the prospect of old age and death ‘rationally.’”); Louise Harmon, Fragments 
on the Deathwatch, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1, 116 (1992) (“[A] sign of the taboo nature of death, even in 
the medical profession, is the avoidance of the dying person. Not only do health care workers not 
want to talk about a patient who is dying, but often they do not want to talk to a patient who is dying. 
Of course, this kind of avoidance behavior is not confined to health care workers; it is just a manife-
station of what is come to be called ‘death anxiety.’”). 
 54. Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures 
Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1989). 
 55. See KASTENBAUM, supra note 46, at 128; see also Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377 (explain-
ing that “personal death is a thought modern man will do almost anything to avoid”). 
 56. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, prefatory note, (2007); Joseph B. Clamon, Tax Policy 
as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and Organ Donation Through Tax Credits, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
67, 67–68 (2008); Cohen, supra note 54, at 9. 
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been suggested,57 but the public’s general reluctance to acknowledge the 
inevitability of death is a primary reason for low organ-donation rates.58 
Other activities that people avoid as a defense mechanism for death an-
xiety include end-of-life medical planning59 and preparation for retire-
ment.60 
Similarly, many people evade thoughts of mortality by refusing to 
prepare an estate plan and execute a will.61 As the sixteenth-century es-
sayist Michel de Montaigne observed, “You can frighten . . . people by 
mentioning death . . . and since it is mentioned in wills, never expect 
them to draw one up before the doctor has pronounced the death-
sentence.”62 Everyone who regularly plans for others’ deaths, even pro-
fessional estate planners and probate lawyers, may be reluctant to ex-
ecute wills because of the resulting contemplation of mortality.63 The 
effects of death anxiety, however, were manifest in the avoidance of es-
tate planning long before the days of Montaigne. For example, in “an-
cient times,” some individuals held irrational beliefs like the fear that 
death closely and attentively follows those who execute wills.64 Not sur-
prisingly, this ubiquitous fear of death continues to affect estate planning 
in modern times, as the avoidance of acknowledging mortality contri-
butes to today’s high rates of intestacy.65 
                                                            
 57. See Clamon, supra note 56, at 68; Cohen, supra note 54, at 9. 
 58. See Cohen, supra note 54, at 10. 
 59. Ben Kusmin, Note, Swing Low, Sweet Chariot: Abandoning the Disinterested Witness 
Requirement for Advance Directives, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 93, 110–11 (2006). 
 60. See Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-
Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 790, 818 (1988). 
 61. See Beyer, supra note 16, at 778 (“[M]any individuals procrastinate in making a will as a 
conscious or unconscious defense against admitting mortality.”); G. Warren Whitaker, Classic Issues 
in Family Succession Planning, PROB. & PROP. 32, 37 (Mar.−Apr. 2003) (“[I]t should not be surpris-
ing when a client with significant succession issues refuses to do any planning, or when a client asks 
his estate planner to prepare his or her will quickly and then allows it to languish unexecuted for 
months.”). 
 62. MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, THE COMPLETE ESSAYS 93 (M. A. Screech trans., Penguin Books 
1991) (1580). 
 63. Beyer, supra note 39, at 419. Professional estate planners may also have difficulty explicit-
ly mentioning the possibility of their client’s death; see Shaffer, supra note 40, at 355–62 (“These 
clients and lawyers (and I should emphasize that I am reporting on the conduct of lawyers as well as 
the conduct of clients) evaded and tended to deny the reality of the clients’ deaths.”). 
 64. Beyer, supra note 39, at 419; see also Hirsch, supra note 39, at 1048 (“For centuries now, 
would-be testators have harbored the fear that if they executed their wills, the documents would 
become relevant in short order.”). 
 65. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 71 (8th ed. 2009). Other 
factors may contribute to a person dying intestate, including a “lack of information about the probate 
system and an unfounded assumption that a person’s ‘family’ automatically inherits the person’s 
property.” Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 643, 650 (2002). Of course, death anxiety, procrastination, and ignorance are not the only 
reasons that one may die intestate. For example, as part of their “gypsy style of life” in which they 
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Another potential consequence of death anxiety is the deterioration 
of the testator’s decision-making capabilities. Montaigne observed this 
consequence of death anxiety five centuries ago when he exclaimed, 
“[I]n the midst of pain and terror [caused by the acknowledgment of 
death], God only knows what shape [the testator’s] good judgement 
kneads [the will] into!”66 Modern legal scholars have confirmed Mon-
taigne’s observation and have reported that “[t]hinking about unpleasant 
facts” such as the inevitability of death “can bias decisionmaking by in-
ducing fear or anxiety,”67 especially in the context of preparing an estate 
plan and executing a will.68 
Perhaps the most significant way that death anxiety affects a testa-
tor’s decision-making process is that it provides an incentive to make 
hastily considered decisions regarding his testamentary scheme. Often-
times, people cope with the anxiety that accompanies significant choices 
by quickly making difficult decisions, thereby abbreviating the stressful 
experience.69 As one psychologist has explained, stressors such as death 
anxiety can “impair decision making [because,] [u]nder stress, people 
who normally consider all aspects of a situation before making a decision 
may act impulsively.”70 This truncated decision-making process is cha-
racterized by an erratic method of selecting information for considera-
tion, an inadequate amount of time spent considering the relevant infor-
mation and evaluating alternatives, and the absence of reevaluation after 
                                                                                                                                     
are “insulated from society,” the “Hell’s Angels don’t find it necessary to leave wills, and their 
deaths don’t require much paperwork . . . . A driver’s license expires, a police record goes into the 
dead file, a motorcycle changes hands and usually a few ‘personal cards’ will be taken out of wallets 
and dropped into wastebaskets.” HUNTER S. THOMPSON, HELL’S ANGELS: A STRANGE AND 
TERRIBLE SAGA 143–44 (Modern Library 1999) (1966). 
 66. MONTAIGNE, supra note 62, at 93. 
 67. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 234 (2008); 
see also Christina Cooley, Maximizing Patient Autonomy through Expanded Medical Surrogacy 
Mediation, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 229, 235 (2006) (“The psychological reluctance of people to 
confront their own mortality along with grief in facing death, denial, anxiety, and loneliness, may 
also severely affect decision-making abilities.”); Elizabeth Baker Murrill, Mass Disaster Mediation: 
Innovative ADR, or A Lion’s Den?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 401, 415–18 (2007) (“[S]tressors on 
the psyche are linked to cognition and capacity for decision making. Cognitive effects of stress are 
significant and include narrowing of attention or perceptual tunneling, reduced working memory, 
and rigidity.”). 
 68. See Marvin B. Sussman et al., Will Making: An Examination of Client and Lawyer Atti-
tudes, 23 FLA. L. REV. 25, 49 (1970) (“[T]he individual who is faced with the possibility of immi-
nent death may make hasty and short-sighted decisions regarding the provisions of his will.”). 
 69. See Willis, supra note 67, at 234. 
 70. DOUGLAS A. BERNSTEIN & PEGGY W. NASH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 397 (4th ed. 
2007); see also Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 
LA. L. REV. 117, 152 (2007) (“Pressure and stress might disrupt optimal decision making. When 
individuals encounter a sufficiently high degree of stress, they are likely to fail to optimally consider 
their options and actions.”). 
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the decision has been made.71 Ultimately, this abridged decision-making 
process can result in the decision-maker acting carelessly and often pro-
duces bad decisions.72 
This defense mechanism for death anxiety and its negative conse-
quences are easily applicable to the estate-planning context.73 For in-
stance, by quickly making decisions concerning an estate plan, the testa-
tor can shorten his confrontation with mortality in an attempt to reduce 
his fear and anxiety of death. But while using this shortened decision-
making process, the testator may not fully consider the factors that typi-
cally influence a testamentary scheme, such as relationships with friends 
and relatives or the extent and nature of property owned. In sum, death 
anxiety’s influence on the decision of whether to plan for the distribution 
of one’s property upon death, as well as its effect on the decision-making 
capabilities of those who do prepare estate plans, illustrates the potential 
negative consequences of confronting death through the estate-planning 
process. The death anxiety that stems from the testator’s inevitable con-
frontation with death is therefore a primary antitherapeutic consequence 
of the estate-planning process. 
B. Estate Disputes and Familial Conflict 
In addition to the anxiety caused by the recognition of mortality,74 a 
testator may also experience fear and anxiety because of the possibility 
of an estate dispute.75 A recent poll found that 18% of wealthy Ameri-
                                                            
 71. See Andrei C. Miu et al., Anxiety and Decision-Making: Toward a Neuroeconomics Pers-
pective, in 20 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH: 
NEUROECONOMICS 55, 66 (2008) (describing the differences between vigilant decision-making and 
hypervigilant decision making). “This kind of decision-making, although originally acknowledged as 
saving time and effort, was nonetheless viewed as a defective coping pattern that interrupted the 
cognitive process required for optimal decision-making. Stress tended to increase the use of hypervi-
gilant decision-making and the frequency of error in logical analogy tasks.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 72. See BERNSTEIN & NASH, supra note 70, at 397; Willis, supra note 67, at 234. 
 73. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 74. See supra Part III.A. 
 75. See John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63, 
85 (1978) (“The testator who has cause to fear that his physical and mental condition will be made 
the basis for extornationate post-mortem litigation challenging his testamentary capacity has a moral 
claim on the legal system to provide him with the means of preventing the depredation.”); Lela P. 
Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More than Money: Mediation Clauses in Estate Planning Docu-
ments, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 564 (2008) (explaining that testators may anticipate or fear 
discord over the provisions of their wills). 
One form of estate dispute is a will contest, which is a challenge of a will’s validity that is usually 
based upon allegations of inadequate mental capacity or undue influence. See Dennis W. Collins, 
Avoiding a Will Contest—The Impossible Dream?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 7, 8 (2000) (“Most will 
contests occur because of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity claims, although they 
may obviously involve lack of proper execution, forgery, altered documents, revocation, mistake, 
fraud, duress and insane delusion.”); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests: An Empirical Study, 22 
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cans fear that their families will fight over their fortunes once they are 
gone.76 Numerous high-profile estate disputes have littered newspaper 
headlines in recent years and illustrate the legitimacy of these fears.77 
These concerns are not limited to large estates, however, as many estate 
disputes are waged even when little material value is at stake.78 Further-
more, although some testators, such as Ishmael (who was a bachelor and 
an orphan),79 may have little to fear because they have no relatives to 
disinherit and therefore no relatives to disappoint, even previously ami-
cable families can turn astringent when a relative’s estate is at issue.80 
The root of a testator’s anxiety regarding a potential estate dispute 
may vary. For example, the testator may fear the family conflict that ac-
companies almost all estate litigation.81 Estate disputes are often brought 
by family members of the decedent who may be motivated by a variety 
of factors, such as perceived unfair treatment by the testator’s distribu-
tive scheme, complicated family dynamics, or strained familial relation-
                                                                                                                                     
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607, 646–52 (1987) (reporting that 74% of will contests involved allega-
tions of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity, and 14% of will contests brought chal-
lenges based upon lack of adherence to required formalities). 
 76. See Jennifer Harper, Splitting Heirs Over Wealth: But Children Usually Inherit Most of It, 
WASH. TIMES, June 18, 2006, at A1. 
 77. See Dean Praetorius & Nathalie Tadena, Celebrity Estate Disputes from Michael Jackson, 
Steve McNair to Anna Nicole Smith, ABC NEWS (June 22, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/ 
story?id=8129259&page=1. “Will contests rarely occur, perhaps on the order of one in one hundred 
or so cases.” Schoenblum, supra note 75, at 614. But a testator’s fears are not unfounded because the 
millions of probates that occur each year make a “one-in-a-hundred litigation pattern[]” a “very 
serious” problem. John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2042 n.5 (1994). Further-
more, “the devastation to family relationships that often accompanies a will contest gives the prob-
lem weight beyond its numbers.” Andrew Stimmel, Note, Mediating Will Disputes: A Proposal to 
Add a Discretionary Mediation Clause to the Uniform Probate Code, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 197, 222 (2002); see also Gerry W. Beyer et al., The Fine Art of Intimidating Disgruntled 
Beneficiaries with In Terrorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REV. 225, 264 (1998) (“Testators . . . have 
legitimate reasons for wanting to avoid contests and their concomitant results.”). 
 78. See Judith G. McMullen, Keeping Peace in the Family While You Are Resting in Peace: 
Making Sense of and Preventing Will Contests, 8 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 61, 61–62 (2006). 
 79. See AUGUST NIGRO, THE NET OF NEMESIS, STUDIES IN TRAGIC BOND/AGE 91 (2000). 
 80. See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Fortune of the Republic, in THE POLITICAL EMERSON, 
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND SOCIAL REFORM 185, 195 (David M. Robinson ed., 2004) 
(“When it comes to divid[ing] an estate, the politest men will sometimes quarrel.”); McMullen, 
supra note 78, at 61 (“Family members often fight over the estates of their departed loved ones. It is 
a safe guess, however, that many of these decedents had confidently assumed that their own families 
would not fight . . . .”). 
 81. See Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve Probate Dis-
putes Over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 397 (1997) (“Persons 
planning the transfer of property after death . . . view family harmony as a tangential, but important 
goal.”); Mary F. Radford, An Introduction to the Uses of Mediation and Other Forms of Dispute 
Resolution in Probate, Trust, and Guardianship Matters, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 637–
38 (2000) (“Many, if not most, cases arising in probate, trust, and guardianship involve families 
whose relationships could be irreparably shattered by bitter and prolonged litigation.”). 
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ships caused by the grief of losing a loved one.82 But regardless of the 
underlying personal reasons for challenges over decedents’ estates, 
“[s]uch contests often breed irreconcilable family feuds.”83 Relatives are 
frequently pitted against each other, old family disputes are renewed, and 
familial relationships are irreversibly damaged.84 Therefore, because the 
preparation of an estate plan can lead to family conflict that spans gener-
ations, the testator may experience antitherapeutic effects from the es-
tate-planning process. 
In addition to straining familial relationships, an estate dispute can 
bring public scrutiny and invasion of privacy, both of which may exacer-
bate family conflict and can cause the testator added fear and anxiety 
during the estate-planning process.85 Because the testator’s mental com-
petency is at issue in the majority of estate disputes,86 estate litigation 
often involves investigations into the testator’s unique and deeply per-
sonal characteristics.87 As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
explained, “Contests over the allowance of wills frequently, if not invari-
ably, result in minute examination into the habits, manners, beliefs, con-
duct, idiosyncrasies, and all the essentially private and personal affairs of 
the testator . . . .”88 
Scrutiny of the testator’s private life may generate criticism and ri-
dicule of the decedent and can be embarrassing and hurtful for the dece-
dent’s family.89 Indeed, most people, even those who believe that they 
have nothing to hide, do not want their personal affairs scrutinized in a 
public forum.90 In the context of estate disputes, the potential damage to 
testators’ reputations is especially acute because they invariably lack the 
                                                            
 82. See Gary, supra note 81, at 415−23; Stimmel, supra note 77, at 199–201; see also Ronald 
Chester, Mediation and Jury Trials as Means of Resolving Will Contests, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
267, 267 (2001) (noting that “will contests are family disputes first and legal and financial ones 
second”). 
 83. Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501, 505 (1881). 
 84. See Gary, supra note 81, at 397; Radford, supra note 81, at 637–38; Yolanda Vorys, Note, 
The Best of Both Worlds: The Use of Med-arb for Resolving Will Disputes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 871, 874–75 (2007). 
 85. See Love & Sterk, supra note 75, at 567. 
 86. See Collins, supra note 75, at 8. 
 87. See Martin D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the Final 
Threat, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 636 (1994); see also Beyer et al., supra note 77, at 264–65. 
 88. Rudd v. Searles, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass. 1928). 
 89. See Begleiter, supra note 87, at 636 (explaining that “the publicity surrounding a will con-
test” is characterized by “ridicule, contempt, and criticism”); Love & Sterk, supra note 75, at 567 
(“A testator whose dispositions depart from social norms may fear a contest because the trial will 
expose his or her personal life, and that of his family, to public humiliation or ridicule.”); see also 
Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886 (“[S]uspicions or beliefs in personal insanity, mental weakness, eccentricities, 
pernicious habits, or other odd characteristics centering in or radiating from the testator, may bring 
his family into evil repute and adversely affect the standing in the community of its members.”). 
 90. See Begleiter, supra note 87, at 636. 
2012]  A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning 441 
opportunity to defend themselves after their death.91 The U.S. Supreme 
Court acknowledged this concern when it observed over one hundred 
years ago that estate disputes “not infrequently [bring] to light matters of 
private life that ought never to be made public, and in respect to which 
the voice of the testator cannot be heard either in explanation or deni-
al.”92 Therefore, because it provides a medium for the public airing of the 
“dirty laundry” of testators and their families,93 the possibility of a will 
contest may cause testators stress and anxiety during the estate-planning 
process. 
In sum, an estate dispute “may bring sorrow and suffering to many 
concerned.”94 A challenge to the validity of a will or another estate-
planning document can tarnish “the fair reputation of the dead” and dis-
rupt “the peace and harmony of the living.”95 The potential for both fa-
milial conflict and public scrutiny are two possible sources of fear and 
anxiety for testators, but they may also worry about a variety of other 
negative consequences of an estate dispute, including the financial deple-
tion of their estates and the frustration of their desired distributive 
schemes.96 As a result, while preparing and implementing an estate plan, 
testators may experience fear and anxiety from the possibility that an 
estate dispute and its negative consequences will plague the administra-
tion of their estates. 
C. Fear of Probate 
In addition to death anxiety97 and anxiousness regarding estate dis-
putes and familial conflict,98 testators may worry about the administra-
                                                            
 91. See Alper v. Alper, 65 A.2d 737, 740 (N.J. 1949) (explaining that will contests provide the 
opportunity for contestants to “besmirch[] the reputation of the testator when he is no longer alive to 
defend himself”); Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886 (explaining that the testator “is not alive and cannot explain 
what may without explanation be given a sinister appearance”). “For most decedents, the fact that 
the spectacle would not occur until after [their] death[s] would provide small solace.” Love & Sterk, 
supra note 75, at 553. 
 92. Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 402 (1898); see also Begleiter, supra note 87, at 
637 (“The recognition of the importance of this factor to testators by the United States Supreme 
Court is quoted in almost every case involving a no-contest clause.”). 
 93. Love & Sterk, supra note 75, at 567 (“A testator . . . may fear a [will] contest be-
cause . . . [of] the prospect that the family’s dirty laundry will be aired in public.”); see also Beglei-
ter, supra note 87, at 636–39 (describing the scrutiny under which a testator’s life is examined dur-
ing a will contest under the heading of “Family Antagonism and the Airing of Dirty Linen in Pub-
lic”). 
 94. Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Love & Sterk, supra note 75, at 539 (explaining that preservation of family harmony, 
conservation of estate assets, and avoidance of airing the family’s dirty laundry are “objectives 
common to many testators”). 
 97. See supra Part III.A. 
 98. See supra Part III.B. 
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tion of their estates after they are gone. Specifically, many people plan-
ning for the disposition of their estates have concerns regarding the pro-
bate process.99 Over the past several decades, the probate process has 
drawn criticism from legal scholars for being cumbersome and ineffi-
cient.100 As Professor John Langbein explained, “The probate system has 
earned a lamentable reputation for expense, delay, clumsiness, make-
work, and worse.”101 Fueled by businesses’ marketing services to avoid 
the probate process,102 those who desire to make estate plans now fre-
quently harbor their own concerns regarding the probate process.103  
These concerns fall within three general categories.104 First, testa-
tors are often concerned with the length of the probate process.105 These 
concerns are not unfounded as “administration of an estate typically lasts 
for many months or even years.”106 Testators realize that their families 
will be coping with their deaths during the probate process,107 and many 
are anxious to circumvent probate in order to shield their families from 
the time-consuming distractions of the process.108 Second, testators often 
fear the administrative costs that accompany the probate process,109 
which include “probate court fees, the commission of the personal repre-
sentative, the attorney’s fees, and, sometimes, appraiser’s and guardian 
                                                            
 99. See THE COLUMBIA RETIREMENT HANDBOOK 220 (Abraham Monk ed., 1994) (“Estate 
planning clients frequently have an exaggerated fear of the probate process . . . .”). Probate is the 
judicially administered process by which a decedent’s debts are paid and legal title of probate assets 
is transferred to the estate beneficiaries. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 39. 
 100. See, e.g., PAULA A. MONOPOLI, AMERICAN PROBATE: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, 
IMPROVING THE PROCESS (2003) (“The American probate process has long been perceived as slow, 
expensive, and corrupt.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem of 
Doctrinal Change, 79 OR. L. REV. 527, 542 (2000) (describing the probate system as “time-
consuming and costly, or even in some venues a modern form of grave-robbery”). 
 101. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succes-
sion, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1116 (1984). 
 102. See Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care 
for the Unlicensed Practice of Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 208–09. 
 103. See THE COLUMBIA RETIREMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 99, at 220. 
 104. John H. Martin, Reconfiguring Estate Settlement, 94 MINN. L. REV. 42, 48 (2009) (“De-
lay, expense, and lack of privacy are three universal criticisms of probate.”). 
 105. See id. 
 106. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 630 (4th ed. 2010); see 
also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 440. 
 107. See Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Pro-
bate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 437–38 (2009) (describing practi-
tioner accounts of clients’ concerns regarding their families enduring the probate process); see also 
Denise Johnson et al., Working Group on the Restructuring of, and Access to, the Judiciary, 34 VT. 
B.J. 38, 40 (2009) (explaining that the “probate court must accommodate a largely pro se clientele in 
various stages of stress or grief”). 
 108. See Susan N. Gary, Transfer-on-Death Deeds: The Nonprobate Revolution Continues, 41 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 529, 531 (2006) (citing delay as a reason that many people attempt to 
avoid probate). 
 109. See Martin, supra note 104, at 50 (“A second universal criticism of probate is expense.”). 
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ad litem’s fees.”110 These expenses can mount quickly,111 and some testa-
tors consequently worry that probate costs will consume a large portion 
of their estates.112 Finally, some testators are concerned with privacy is-
sues, which can arise even absent an estate dispute.113 Because the testa-
tor’s will is a public record, free to be viewed by anyone,114 some testa-
tors fear public scrutiny of their financial and familial matters.115 
In sum, while preparing an estate plan, the testator may harbor fears 
of the probate system because it can cause lengthy delays in the adminis-
tration of the estate, excessive administrative costs, and invasions of pri-
vacy.116 The anxiety that these concerns produce is exemplified by the 
time, money, and effort that many people expend to avoid the probate 
process. Fear of probate is therefore a potential negative psychological 
effect of preparing an estate plan. When taken together with death anxie-
ty117 and concerns regarding estate disputes and familial conflict,118 these 
fears comprise the antitherapeutic consequences of the estate-planning 
process. 
IV. THERAPEUTIC CONSEQUENCES OF ESTATE PLANNING 
Although the estate-planning process can cause death anxiety and 
other antitherapeutic consequences,119 many testators experience peace 
and satisfaction from preparing and implementing estate plans.120 For 
example, Ishmael drew comfort from his testamentary experience aboard 
the Pequod, and he was not alone in using his estate plan as a source of 
contentment while at sea.121 While Ishmael’s actions may appear idio-
syncratic, the use of the estate-planning process as a distraction from the 
perilous environment in which sailors worked was not an isolated occur-
                                                            
 110. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 45–46. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See Gary, supra note 108, at 541; Ellen Sugrue Hyman & William Josh Ard, Trust Mills 
and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 86 MICH. B.J. 26, 28 (2007) (Members of the public have 
“concerns that they will lose their hard-earned money through the onerous costs of . . . probate.”); 
Martin, supra note 104, at 50. 
 113. See Martin, supra note 104, at 51–52. 
 114. See Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 721–22 (2006). 
 115. See Gary, supra note 108, at 531 (citing the “desire for privacy” as a major factor in the 
decision to avoid probate); Martin, supra note 104, at 51–52 (“Lack of privacy is a third significant 
objection to traditional probate.”). 
 116. See Martin, supra note 104, at 48–52. 
 117. See supra Part III.A. 
 118. See supra Part III.B. 
 119. See supra Part III. 
 120. See Shaffer, supra note 40, at 368 (“[C]lients find the experience of realistic, informed 
‘estate planning’ therapeutic.”). 
 121. MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 248. 
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rence aboard whaling ships.122 As Ishmael described, “It may seem 
strange that of all men sailors should be tinkering at their last wills and 
testaments, but there are no people in the world more fond of that diver-
sion.”123 The use of testamentary power as a therapeutic tool was so 
common that sailors often amended their wills on multiple occasions 
while at sea, as Ishmael himself did three times prior to his encounter 
with the Whale.124 Ishmael’s account is silent as to the precise source of 
his contentment;125 however, several aspects of the estate-planning 
process may explain the therapeutic nature of his testamentary expe-
rience. 
A. Freedom of Testation 
Subject to limited exceptions, testators enjoy broad freedom to craft 
their estate plans as they choose.126 For example, Ishmael took advantage 
of this liberty when he bequeathed his entire estate to his friend, Quee-
queg.127 Testamentary freedom is so fundamental that it has consistently 
been heralded as the keystone of the law of succession.128 A number of 
policies underlie freedom of testation,129 including that the doctrine fos-
ters the testator’s autonomy by allowing him to make significant deci-
sions concerning the distribution of his estate.130 This opportunity for 
                                                            
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 248–49. Some have suggested that Ishmael’s satisfaction stemmed from his achiev-
ing a kind of immortality through the writing of his will. See, e.g., EDWIN S. SHNEIDMAN, A 
COMMONSENSE BOOK OF DEATH: REFLECTIONS AT NINETY OF A LIFELONG THANATOLOGIST 150 
(2008); Tony Tanner, Introduction to HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK xxv (Oxford Univ. Press 
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character that derives ambiguous pleasure from testamentary power. When Henry Morley is called 
“crazy” by Ray Smith, who is the fictional representation of Kerouac and the story’s narrator, he 
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KEROUAC, THE DHARMA BUMS 31 (Penguin Books 2006) (1958). 
 126. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 
491 (1975); see also In re Caruthers’ Estate, 151 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (“A testa-
tor’s right to bestow his property by will at death is as absolute as his right to convey it during his 
life time.”). 
 127. MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 248. 
 128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
(2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the 
donor’s intention.”); Langbein, supra note 126, at 491 (“The first principle of the law of wills is 
freedom of testation.”). 
 129. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K. S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 
IND. L.J. 1, 6–14 (1992) (providing a comprehensive description of the various rationales for allow-
ing testamentary freedom). 
 130. See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. 
REV. 1705, 1754 (1992); see also Wisnom, supra note 34, at 1354–55 (“[I]t is not a surprise that the 
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self-determination can have therapeutic consequences for the testator 
because psychological welfare generally improves when one is allowed 
to make important choices autonomously.131 As Winick explained, “[I]f 
given meaningful choices, individuals will perceive themselves as in 
control of their lives rather than as mere passive victims of forces they 
can neither understand nor control.”132 Consequently, “people [generally] 
feel better about making their own decisions rather than having them im-
posed upon them by another.”133 
The most basic therapeutic consequence of the autonomous deci-
sion-making permitted by testamentary freedom is the testators’ satisfac-
tion of knowing that they have wide latitude to prepare an estate plan that 
best fulfills their preferences. Although state legislatures attempt to craft 
intestacy statutes in a way that mimics most individuals’ testamentary 
preferences,134 all testators are unique and best know their own distinct 
needs and desires.135 As such, a testator whose preferences differ from 
the default distributional scheme of intestacy will find satisfaction in tes-
tamentary freedom. As Winick further explained, “An individual’s 
choices from the menu of life are inevitably bound to prove more self-
satisfying and suitable than any made by an impersonal bureaucrat or 
even an enlightened philosopher king.”136 Therefore, because testators 
best know their unique testamentary preferences, they can receive thera-
peutic benefit from the ability to freely construct the substance of their 
estate plans in a way that matches those preferences. 
Of the various preferences that testators can satisfy through free-
dom of testation, perhaps the most urgent and universal is the care of 
their families after the testators’ own deaths.137 Because testamentary 
                                                                                                                                     
concept of autonomy is a factor in probates, since writing a will is the mechanism by which an indi-
vidual determines how and to whom his property will be distributed.”). 
 131. Beyer, supra note 16, at 779 (“Estate planning . . . permits persons to exercise increased 
self-determination and consequently provides them with a sense of control over their environment 
and destiny.”); Winick, supra note 130, at 1766–67; Winick, supra note 15, at 191 (“[S]elf-
determination is therapeutically advantageous.”); Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Role of Counsel in Litigation, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 105, 113 (2000) (“Exercising a degree of control 
and self-determination in significant aspects of one’s life may be an important ingredient of psycho-
logical wellbeing.”); Wisnom, supra note 34, at 1353. 
 132. Winick, supra note 130, at 1766. 
 133. Winick, supra note 131, at 112–13. 
 134. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 75. 
 135. See Baron, supra note 49, at 652. 
 136. Winick, supra note 130, at 1756. 
 137. See Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly in the Uniform 
Laws, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 913 (1999) (“Most testators are bent on providing for their fami-
lies.”); Shaffer, supra note 14, at 385 (explaining that the “general impression” that testators’ most 
pressing concern is planning for the care of their families is confirmed in tests of “wills clients”); 
Sussman et al., supra note 68, at 49 (reporting results from a study that showed “[t]he principal 
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freedom allows testators to prepare their estate plans as they choose, they 
can distribute their estates to relatives, which both helps meet familial 
needs and provides the testators the satisfaction of knowing that they 
have taken steps to meet those needs. Indeed, many testators feel a pro-
found moral responsibility to provide financial support to family mem-
bers through their estate plans, and satisfying this moral obligation can 
provide great comfort.138 Unsurprisingly, most testators fulfill this per-
ceived moral duty and distribute the bulk of their estates within the fami-
ly.139 Therefore, because testamentary freedom can provide comfort and 
satisfaction to testators by allowing them to make autonomous choices 
regarding the distribution of their estates, freedom of testation is one the-
rapeutic consequence of the estate-planning process. 
B. Lawyers as Counselors 
Another potentially therapeutic aspect of estate planning is the role 
of estate-planning attorneys who, in addition to acting as legal represent-
atives, can provide personal support to their clients. Consider, for exam-
ple, Ishmael’s testamentary experience aboard the Pequod. Unlike the 
typical testator who engages a lawyer during the estate-planning 
process,140 Ishmael lacked access to an attorney while at sea.141 Nonethe-
less, Ishmael asked his crewmate, Queequeg, to accompany him below 
deck and take part in the testamentary experience.142 As Ishmael recalled, 
“I say, I thought I might as well go below and make a rough draft of my 
will. ‘Queequeg,’ said I, ‘come along, you shall be my lawyer, executor, 
                                                                                                                                     
reason why individuals [make] wills [is] their desire to protect the well-being of members of their 
immediate families”). 
In addition to the inability to provide continuing support to their families, a second consequence 
of death that troubles many testators is the realization that their “plans and projects [will] come to an 
end.” Shaffer, supra note 52, at 984. An estate plan, however, can be viewed “as a method to pro-
long experience through continuation of projects.” Shaffer, supra note 14, at 380. A financial be-
quest to family members may satisfy the testator’s desire for the continuation of projects, but other 
bequests may also serve this purpose, such as gifts to provide for the care of a beloved pet. See gen-
erally Breahn Vokolek, Comment, America Gets What It Wants: Pet Trusts and a Future for Its 
Companion Animals, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1109 (2008). 
 138. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 387–88; Sussman et al., supra note 68, at 36. 
 139. CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT 207 (1987). 
 140. See Daphna Hacker, Soulless Wills, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 957, 977–80 (2010) 
(“[L]awyers dominate the will-production market, and most testators turn to them for advice in draft-
ing their wills.”). 
 141. But in certain regards, the sailors onboard the Pequod had to act as their own lawyers. See 
MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 432 (“But though no other nation has ever had any written whaling law, 
yet the American fisherman have been their own legislators and lawyers in this matter.”); see also 
Robert C. Deal, Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish: How Whalemen, Lawyers, and Judges Created the British 
Property Law of Whaling, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 199, 200–01 (2010). 
 142. MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 248. 
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and legatee.’”143 Ishmael’s putative estate-planning attorney had no legal 
training and could not offer advice regarding the technicalities of will 
execution; however, Queequeg could provide companionship and psy-
chological support. Like Ishmael’s trusted friend, a formally trained law-
yer can assist the testator with more than mere legal issues, and in doing 
so, the estate-planning attorney can be a therapeutic agent for the client. 
A lawyer’s duties have long included responsibilities outside the 
realm of traditional legal services,144 and while providing legal represen-
tation, a lawyer frequently gives advice regarding nonlegal issues.145 For 
example, some clients’ legal problems may be closely tied to correspond-
ing nonlegal issues.146 But in an effort to obtain psychological support 
regarding largely personal issues, other clients may seek assistance with 
problems that have little or no legal consequences.147 As a result, lawyers 
often address more than just the legal aspects of their clients’ prob-
lems.148 When the representation of a client focuses on these nonlegal 
issues, the lawyer’s services are commonly classified as counseling.149 
Certain considerations may dissuade lawyers from providing coun-
seling services,150 but many do spend a large portion of their time coun-
                                                            
 143. Id. 
 144. See Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications of 
Counseling Clients on Nonlegal Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 365 (2005) (explain-
ing that “[a]s they have for centuries,” “[l]awyers must often be more than lawyers” in today’s legal 
market); Margaret Keeney Rosenheim, The Lawyer as a Family Counselor: As the Social Worker 
Sees Him, 22 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 28, 28 (1953) (explaining that “counseling in the law” has been 
“importan[t] from time immemorial”). 
 145. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006) (“In representing a client, a lawyer 
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a 
lawyer may refer not only to law but also to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, 
and political factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”). 
 146. See Gantt, supra note 144, at 366. 
 147. See Robert C. Mussehl, From Advocate to Counselor: The Emerging Role of the Family 
Law Practitioner, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 443, 446 (1976) (explaining that clients “consult lawyers about 
matters which have little to do with legal issues and instead simply seek emotional support”). 
 148. Gantt, supra note 144, at 365 (explaining that lawyers often address the “moral, econom-
ic, and other nonlegal factors affecting their [clients’] situations”). 
 149. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers, Counselors, and Counselors at Law, 61 A.B.A. J. 854, 
854 (1975) (explaining that a lawyer’s counseling services often involve “subject matters that do not 
result in documents, lawsuits, or negotiations with third persons”); Andrew S. Watson, The Lawyer 
as Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7, 7 (1965) (“Although persons going into practice of law have many and 
diverse interests, there will be thrust upon all of them to some degree, tasks which are best described 
as counseling.”). 
 150. See Evan R. Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Counselor: Using Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence to Enhance Client Counseling for Combat Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 202 
MIL. L. REV. 185, 193–94 (2009) (suggesting that lawyers “may fear professional consequences for 
practicing psychology without a license,” and that “[t]hey may believe that their lack of training and 
experience could hurt . . . the client”). 
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seling clients on nonlegal issues.151 For example, divorce attorneys are 
often charged with counseling responsibilities because, while preparing 
for divorce, clients are dealing with a wide array of psychological is-
sues.152 The emotionally charged nature of divorce therefore provides 
lawyers with a ripe opportunity to be therapeutic agents for their 
clients.153 
Similar to divorce, which signals the “death of a marriage,”154 the 
preparation and implementation of an estate plan foreshadows the death 
of the testator and can negatively affect the client’s emotional and psy-
chological well-being.155 For instance, while preparing an estate plan and 
executing a will, the testator must confront the inevitability of death, 
which can cause death anxiety.156 Estate-planning lawyers thus have the 
opportunity not only to guide testators through the estate-planning 
process, but also to be therapeutic agents for their clients by addressing 
the negative psychological consequences of preparing an estate plan.157 
The lawyer’s services should not replace those of a mental health 
care professional,158 but the lawyer should be aware of the client’s psy-
chological issues and “explore with the client the need to find appropri-
ate ways to resolve them so that the client can move forward.”159 While 
aiding their clients during the estate-planning process, lawyers can in-
quire about testators’ potential death anxiety and discuss the specific 
                                                            
 151. See Mussehl, supra note 147, at 446; Shaffer, supra note 149, at 854. One somewhat 
outdated study found that “[t]he average lawyer spends about a third of his time counseling,” and an 
older study suggested that some lawyers may “spend as much as 80 percent of their professional 
time . . . counseling.” Shaffer, supra note 149, at 854. 
 152. See Mussehl, supra note 147, at 443 (“The client is often confused, frightened, and suffer-
ing emotional hurt.”); see also Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 765 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (“Divorce 
brings out the worst in every individual; anxiety, emotion, anger, and revenge run rampant.”). 
 153. Mussehl, supra note 147, at 443 (“The lawyer, acting in a powerful and trusted capacity, 
is in a prime position to direct either a destructive or a constructive course of action for the client.”). 
 154. Esther Oshiver Fisher, A Guide to Divorce Counseling, 22 FAM. COORDINATOR 55, 55 
(1973) (explaining that “the husband and wife together with their children are the mourners, the 
lawyers are the undertakers, the court is the cemetery where the coffin is sealed and the dead mar-
riage buried”). 
 155. See supra Part III. 
 156. See supra Part III. 
 157. Shaffer, supra note 14, at 376 (“Lawyers who advise clients and draft documents in the 
‘estate planning’ practice are counselors in more than the traditional legal sense. They are counselors 
in the therapeutic or developmental sense.”); Richard Susskind, How the Traditional Role of Law-
yers Will Change, TIMES ONLINE (Nov. 5, 2007) (“Private client lawyers (for example, those who 
advise on divorces and draft wills) tell me that their job is not really about law; rather, they insist, 
they are experienced counselors, confidantes, therapists even, in whom their clients have unwavering 
faith in relation to their personal problems.”). 
 158. See Kathryn Webb Bradley, Knowing Law’s Limits: Comments on “Forgiveness: Integral 
to Close Relationships and Inimical to Justice?”, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 322, 332 (2009). 
 159. Id.; see also Marc W. Patry et al., Better Legal Counseling Through Empirical Research: 
Identifying Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 439, 441 (1998). 
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concerns that may contribute to clients’ fears, such as the responsibility 
to fulfill familial needs and the desire to continue important plans and 
projects.160 After this discussion, the lawyer can alleviate some of the 
client’s anxiety by preparing an estate plan that meets the client’s specif-
ic needs.161 Furthermore, death anxiety often impairs testators’ decision-
making processes by drawing their attention from the significant deci-
sions and relevant information that affect estate plans.162 The estate-
planning lawyer, however, can encourage the testator to remain focused 
on the important issues at hand and to consider carefully all relevant in-
formation when making testamentary decisions.163 
Although a testator’s most common fears relate to the consequences 
of death, the testator may also harbor anxieties regarding potential estate 
disputes, familial conflicts,164 and probate-administration issues.165 The 
testator’s lawyer can ease these concerns by suggesting estate-planning 
techniques aimed at reducing the possibility of an estate dispute166 or by 
facilitating constructive discussions between the testator and potentially 
disappointed relatives.167 The lawyer can also reduce some of the testa-
                                                            
 160. See supra Part III.A. 
 161. Shaffer, supra note 14, at 397 (“Lawyers who understand these anxieties are able to help 
their clients leave the law office realistically consoled by the discovery that law provides ways” to 
alleviate these concerns, including means “to feed one’s children, to continue one’s business, and to 
rob death of some of its ability to frighten the living.”); see also Beyer, supra note 39, at 420 
(“[T]actful counseling by the attorney during the entire estate planning process[] may make it easier 
for clients to cope with the inevitability of death.”). 
 162. See supra Part III.A. 
 163. See Sussman et al., supra note 68, at 37 (“Where the client perceives the immediacy of 
death, it may be important for the attorney to determine if the client’s plans are well considered and 
satisfactory for the foreseeable future.”); see also Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377 (explaining that 
testators who seek counsel from an estate-planning lawyer are “better able to make choices”). In-
deed, “in subtle and unobtrusive ways [the lawyer can] influence[] his client to make the right deci-
sion[s].” Sussman et al., supra note 68, at 41. 
 164. See supra Part III.B. 
 165. See supra Part III.C. 
 166. “Testators benefit significantly when issues of conflict are resolved during the estate 
planning process. For instance, testators gain peace of mind by knowing there will be greater likelih-
ood of family harmony after they pass . . . .” Paul Fisher, The Power Tools of Estate Conflict Man-
agement, Recharging the Culture of Estate Conflicts, Part 2, PROB. & PROP., at 42, 42–43 (Ju-
ly−Aug. 2010) (suggesting methods of avoiding estate disputes). 
 167. See Patry et al., supra note 159, at 441–42. Patry et al. states the following: 
For example, consider the situation of elderly parents with two adult children, one of 
whom functions marginally because of a history of drug and alcohol problems. If, in 
drafting a will, the parents leave funds outright to one child, but leave the money in a 
trust to the one with drug problems, the parents may be creating a situation of hurt and 
hard feelings. A lawyer . . . [can] discuss with the clients possible strategies of dealing 
with—and minimizing—the law-related psychological distress. For instance, the clients 
might speak now with the adult children, or they might specify in the will why they are 
taking the indicated action, and so forth. 
Id. 
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tor’s fears of probate by explaining the intricacies of the probate process 
and by providing the testator with realistic estimates of the delay and 
expense of the process. 
All told, the responsibilities of the estate-planning lawyer inherent-
ly include providing counseling services with respect to nonlegal is-
sues.168 Although the estate-planning process can produce negative psy-
chological consequences,169 lawyers who fulfill their counseling respon-
sibilities can reduce these negative effects by providing emotional sup-
port, encouraging testators to focus on the task at hand, and reminding 
testators that the law provides ways to address their concerns.170 If clients 
show signs of extreme death anxiety or other severe emotional conse-
quences resulting from the antitherapeutic aspects of estate planning, 
lawyers can direct them to mental-health professionals who can better 
address their psychological issues.171 
C. The Will-Execution Ceremony 
Although in recent years various legal instruments such as revoca-
ble trusts have become part of the estate-planning process,172 a will is 
still an important component of most estate plans.173 As such, many 
                                                            
 168. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377 (explaining that estate-planning lawyers cannot avoid 
being counselors). 
 169. See supra Part III. 
 170. See Shaffer, supra note 40, at 368 (“[T]he professional relationship between wills client 
and lawyer, when pursued candidly and with realistic and thorough consideration of what is in-
volved, helps to allay [the testator’s] anxiety about death.”); Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377. 
 171. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 4 (2006) (“Family matters can in-
volve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social 
work . . . . Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent 
lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation.”); Shaffer, supra note 
149, at 854 (“We need to learn how to recognize . . . how to respect the competence of other counse-
lors, how to refer a client to them with ease and with some assurance that the client will follow our 
advice.”). See generally Carol M. Suzuki, When Something Is Not Quite Right: Considerations for 
Advising a Client to Seek Mental Health Treatment, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 209 (2009). 
 172. See Langbein, supra note 101, at 1109–13 (describing the rise of the will substitutes). 
Langbein further notes, 
Either by declaration of trust or by transfer to a third-party trustee, the appropriate trust 
terms can replicate the incidents of a will. The owner who retains both the equitable life 
interest and the power to alter and revoke the beneficiary designation has used the trust 
form to achieve the effect of testation. Only nomenclature distinguishes the remainder in-
terest created by such a trust from the mere expectancy arising under a will. Under either 
the trust or the will, the interest of the beneficiaries is both revocable and ambulatory. 
Id. 
 173. Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will: An 
Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 160–62 (2008) (“[A] revocable trust will not 
eliminate the need for a will; a will is still strongly advised under any plan to address any property 
missed, either now or in the future, by any nonprobate technique being utilized.”); see also Ralph C. 
Brashier, Policy, Perspective, and the Proxy Will, 61 S.C. L. REV. 63, 63 n.1 (2009) (“Today, of 
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people follow Ishmael’s lead and execute wills when preparing for the 
disposition of their property upon death. While reflecting on his expe-
rience with the will-execution process, Ishmael described the creation of 
his will as a “ceremony.”174 Likewise, legal scholars have consistently 
characterized the will-execution process as “ritualistic”175 and “cere-
monial.”176 This description stems from the formalities of will execution, 
which generally require that a will be written, signed, and attested by at 
least two witnesses.177 These formalities not only show the testator’s in-
tent to create a will but also transform the will-execution process into a 
ceremony or a ritual that can have therapeutic consequences for the testa-
tor. 
One purpose of many ceremonies is to publicly signify the impor-
tance of the participants’ decisions, actions, or achievements.178 Mar-
riage, for example, is a momentous occasion, and one purpose of an ela-
borate wedding ceremony is to provide a physical setting that symbolizes 
the significance of the couple’s decision to marry.179 The exchange of 
rings, the recitation of vows, and the presence of witnesses all represent 
and impress on the wedding couple the significance of the event.180 Like 
the decision to marry, the important choices that a testator makes while 
creating an estate plan and executing a will warrant the acknowledgment 
and validation of a meaningful setting in which to finalize those deci-
sions.181 As one scholar has explained, “The estate planning 
                                                                                                                                     
course, a large variety of will substitutes compete with and often even replace the will. Even so, the 
will remains important for many estates.” (citations omitted)). 
 174. MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 249. 
 175. See, e.g., Joseph Karl Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the Guttenberg Paradigm: 
The Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 131 (2008); Susan Tracey Stearns, 
Note, Compressing Testamentary Intent Into Inter Vivos Delivery: What Makes a Conveyance Effec-
tive?—In re Estate of O’Brien, 109 Wash.2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988), 64 WASH. L. REV. 479, 481 
n.22 (1989). 
 176. See, e.g., Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against Holograph-
ic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 111 (2006); Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification 
of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1941). 
 177. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 225. 
 178. JOHN SKORUPSKI, SYMBOL AND THEORY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THEORIES OF 
RELIGION IN SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 94 (1976) (“[T]he general characteristic of [a] ceremony” is 
“that of making something out as proper and as socially on record.”). For example, the graduation 
ceremony is recognition of the significant achievements of the graduates. See Jones v. Clear Creek 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992). Similarly, corporate management may use 
ceremonies to signify important business milestones. See RICHARD L. DAFT & PATRICIA G. LANE, 
MANAGEMENT 78 (9th ed. 2009). 
 179. See JAMES L. GOLDEN ET AL., THE RHETORIC OF WESTERN THOUGHT 20 (8th ed. 2003); 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 240–41. 
 180. See Scott, supra note 179, at 241–42. 
 181. See Estate Planning for Human Beings, 3 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. § 69.1902 (P. 
Heckerling ed., 1969) [hereinafter Estate Planning] (statement of Dean Willard H. Pedrick, panel-
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process . . . ought to be a high ceremonial occasion because a client 
should be getting great intangible satisfaction about the[] significant de-
cisions that he has made [and] that were embodied in the instruments 
[that] he leaves behind.”182 Accordingly, the ceremonial quality of will 
execution signifies the importance of the testator’s actions,183 and the 
testamentary process consequently serves as a therapeutic experience for 
the testator.184 
In addition to signifying the importance of the testamentary act, the 
will-execution ceremony gives testators a context through which to cope 
with their inevitable confrontation with death. Indeed, many ceremonies 
give participants a structured framework in which to organize and reflect 
on their thoughts and emotions,185 a quality that can have positive psy-
chological consequences.186 This therapeutic quality of ritual is perhaps 
best exemplified by the funeral ceremony, which has often been de-
scribed as a therapeutic experience for the surviving friends and family 
of the deceased.187 Whatever form the ceremony takes, the funeral 
achieves these therapeutic results by “help[ing] those . . . who remain to 
organize [their] relationship with the deceased [and] to remember the 
deceased within a framework.”188 Furthermore, the funeral’s therapeutic 
effect lasts beyond the end of the service, as the ceremonial nature of the 
                                                                                                                                     
ist); John A. Warnick, The Ungrateful Living: An Estate Planner’s Nightmare—The Trial Attorney’s 
Dream, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 401, 422–23 (1989) (explaining that “the ceremonial aspect” of 
will execution “may be important in fulfilling the clients unexpressed expectations”). 
 182. Estate Planning, supra note 181, § 69.1902. 
 183. See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1064–65 
(1996) (“The arcane minuet of the will-execution ceremony, like the marriage ceremony, serves to 
impress upon the testator that on this occasion her words count, that this is no time for idle banter.”). 
 184. See Beyer, supra note 39, at 420. 
 185. See KEVIN CROTTY, THE POETICS OF SUPPLICATION: HOMER’S ILLIAD AND ODYSSEY 17 
(1994) (explaining that ceremonial formalities “owe their significance in the first instance to their 
ability to impress a distinctive shapeliness on life and, with it, a greater density of meaning than is 
possible in the less structured, everyday course of events”); ANJALI GERA, THREE GREAT AFRICAN 
NOVELISTS: CHINUA ACHEBE, WOLE SOYINKA & AMOS TUTUOLA 26 (2001) (“[C]eremonies pro-
vide a framework for experiencing reality.”). 
 186. See CROTTY, supra note 185, at 17 (explaining that formalities “enable [the ceremony] to 
be an enlightening experience for its participants”). 
 187. See JAMES K. CRISSMAN, DEATH AND DYING IN CENTRAL APPALACHIA: CHANGING 
ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 95 (1994) (“Most contemporary psychiatrists, psychologists, grief coun-
selors, funeral directors, members of the clergy, and other experts in the area of thanatology maintain 
that emotional expression during the wake and funeral is therapeutic.”); see also DAVID HENDIN, 
GRIEF AND BEREAVEMENT, in GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 184 (Beth B. Hess ed., 1980) (explaining 
that a funeral “is a ceremony [that] assuages the grief of the survivors and is a comfort to them in 
their loss”); WALTER W. WHITAKER III, THE CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FUNERAL RITUAL, in 
RITUAL AND CEREMONIES IN POPULAR CULTURE 324 (Ray B. Browne ed., 1980) (“The first and 
foremost [purpose of the funeral] is, of course, its capacity for enabling us to handle our grief.”). 
 188. WHITAKER, supra note 187, at 316. 
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funeral can provide a lasting memory on which those in mourning can 
reflect and take comfort.189 
Like the funeral ceremony, which helps survivors cope with the de-
cedent’s death, the will-execution ceremony can provide testators with a 
structured framework through which to process the anxiety, fear, stress, 
or other negative psychological consequences of preparing for their own 
death. While participating in the will-execution ceremony, instead of 
dwelling solely on their own mortality, testators must focus on the re-
quirements of testamentary formality. As a result, the testator’s thoughts 
are drawn away from the fear and anxiety that accompany the considera-
tion of death, and are instead focused on the positive aspects of estate 
planning,190 such as the preparation for the future, the fulfillment of fa-
milial needs, and the distribution of the estate according to the testator’s 
wishes.191 Additionally, like the funeral ceremony, which can provide 
friends and family members a comforting memory of their relationship 
with the deceased, the will-execution ceremony can provide testators 
with a lasting reminder that they have prepared for death, which can 
comfort them long after the ceremony is over.192 
In addition to creating an environment that both signifies the impor-
tance of testators’ decisions and provides a structured context in which to 
process their thoughts and emotions, the will-execution ceremony can 
bolster testators’ decision-making capabilities.193 As previously dis-
                                                            
 189. See Robert J. Grindle, Note, Frenzy-Free Funerals: The Least America Owes Its Fallen 
Heroes, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 637, 652 (2009) (stating that to deal with the emotions evoked by the 
death of a friend or family member, “the funeral serves a coping function and may form a lasting 
memory surrounding the death of a loved one”). 
 190. Kelly A. Hardin, Note, An Analysis of the Virginia Wills Act Formalities and the Need for 
a Dispensing Power Statute in Virginia, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1145, 1153 n.51 (1993) (“Because 
making a will is often a traumatic event, testators may need the formalities to help them avoid dis-
tractions . . . .”); see also CROTTY, supra note 185, at 18 (explaining that “in highly emotional situa-
tions” ceremonies “can enable the one afflicted to get out from under the immediate throes of emo-
tion”). In his nonfiction account of Spanish bullfighting, Ernest Hemingway provided an example of 
a ceremony that focuses attention away from traumatic events, which in the context of bullfighting is 
the tragic death of the horses. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, DEATH IN THE AFTERNOON 16 (Scribner 1999) 
(1932). As he described: 
I believe that the tragedy of the bullfight is so well ordered and so strongly disciplined by 
ritual that a person feeling the whole tragedy cannot separate the minor comic-tragedy of 
the horse so as to feel it emotionally. If they sense the meaning and end of the whole 
thing even when they know nothing about it; feel that this thing they do not understand is 
going on, the business of the horses is nothing more than an incident. 
Id. 
 191. See supra Part IV.A. 
 192. The ceremonial nature of the will-execution process “fix[es] the event in the memory of 
[the witnesses] who may survive.” Langbein, supra note 126, at 517. Likewise, the ceremony can 
provide testators with a lasting memory of their planning and preparation for death. 
 193. Lydia A. Clougherty, An Analysis of the National Advsiory Committee on the Uniform 
State Laws’ Recommendation to Modify the Wills Act Formalities, 10 PROB. L.J. 283, 284 (1991) 
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cussed, the fear and anxiety that accompanies testators’ contemplation of 
mortality can impair their decision-making processes by taking their at-
tention away from important decisions.194 The ceremonial nature of the 
will-execution process, however, can improve the testator’s decision-
making process in two ways. 
First, because testators do not often participate in ceremonies,195 the 
testamentary ritual is distinguished from the mundane and relatively in-
consequential tasks of daily life.196 The will-execution ceremony there-
fore impresses on testators the importance of their actions and deci-
sions197 and consequently improves testators’ decision-making processes 
by encouraging them to contemplate their testamentary choices and to 
carefully consider all relevant information.198 Second, by providing testa-
tors with a framework through which to cope with their fears and anxie-
ties, the will-execution ceremony draws their thoughts away from the 
psychological distractions that hinder their decision-making processes.199 
As a result, testators can focus on the testamentary decisions they must 
make. The ritualistic nature of the will-execution process can therefore 
improve the testator’s decision-making capabilities both by stressing the 
importance of the testator’s decisions and by reducing the testator’s psy-
chological distractions. 
Altogether, the ritualistic characteristics of the will-execution 
process can have positive psychological consequences for the testator. 
The testator can take satisfaction from the formal setting in which the 
testamentary act takes place,200 and the structured process of the ceremo-
ny can provide the testator a framework through which to cope with the 
                                                                                                                                     
(“There is a great need for formalities to accompany will execution because the psychological effects 
of drawing up a will inhibit the desired circumspective frame of mind, that of clear intent and delibe-
rate estate planning.”). 
 194. See supra Part III.A. 
 195. See Estate Planning, supra note 181, § 69.1902 (statement of Dean Willard H. Pedrick, 
panelist). 
 196. See Kusmin, supra note 59, at 99; James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Require-
ment for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 544 (1990). 
 197. See In re Estate of Bilivskoy, 382 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Langbein, 
supra note 126, at 495. 
 198. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941) 
(“A formality may . . . perform a cautionary or deterrent function by acting as a check against incon-
siderate action.”); C. Douglass Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: 
An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement To-
ward Amorphism, Part One: The Wills Act Formula, the Rite of Testation, and the Question of In-
tent: A Problem in Search of a Solution, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 261 (1991) (“A secondary aspect of 
formality is its tendency to induce deliberation and reflection on the part of the testator.”). 
 199. See Hardin, supra note 190, at 1153 n.51; see also Clougherty, supra note 193, at 285 
(“The formalities safeguard against psychological distractions which may disturb the testators deli-
berate and accurate estate planning.”). 
 200. See supra notes 178–84 and accompanying text. 
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stress and anxiety that accompanies the contemplation of death.201 Fur-
thermore, by impressing on testators the importance of their decisions 
and by relieving some of the anxiety of preparing an estate plan and 
creating a will,202 the will-execution ceremony can improve testators’ 
decision-making processes. The positive psychological effect of the will-
execution ceremony is therefore one of the estate-planning process’s the-
rapeutic qualities.203 
D. Testamentary Self-Expression 
An additional therapeutic aspect of estate planning is the testator’s 
opportunity for self-expression.204 An estate plan is inherently expres-
sive. By preparing an estate plan and implementing that plan through the 
execution of a will and other estate-planning documents, testators com-
municate to their friends, family, and community how they would prefer 
to dispose of their estates.205 Moreover, testators can also express their 
thoughts, feelings, and emotions through their desired plans of distribu-
tion.206 This type of self-expression often takes the form of a testamenta-
ry bequest, in which the act of giving, not the testator’s words, is the me-
dium of self-expression.207 For example, the testator can express love by 
giving a close friend or relative a portion of his or her estate, just as Ish-
mael did when he bequeathed his entire estate to Queequeg, his trusted 
                                                            
 201. See supra notes 185–92 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra notes 193–99 and accompanying text. 
 203. Beyer, supra note 39, at 420 (“A proper ceremony, coupled with sensitive and tactful 
counseling by the attorney during the entire estate planning process, may make it easier for clients to 
cope with the inevitability of death.”); Shaffer, supra note 14, at 382 (“Data . . . indicate[] that will-
preparation actually reduces fear of death and has a constructive or even therapeutic effect on death 
anxiety.”). 
 204. Baron, supra note 49, at 648–49 (“To the extent that a will is an expression of autonomy 
and self-determination, what it can be expected to communicate is the testator’s unique and personal 
ideas . . . .”); Brashier, supra note 173, at 63 n.1 (“[T]he will is far more likely than most informal 
will substitutes to reveal unique aspects of the testator’s personality.”). 
 205. Baron, supra note 49, at 650 (“The testator cannot carry out his own commands, but in-
stead is dependent on others to read the will and put its commands into effect. The testator thus must 
by necessity write for others.”). 
 206. Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic 
Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 61 (2009) (“Wills have an expressive function and tell the 
story of the testator; a will can express love or anger, or disgust or praise. The will gives permanent 
voice to the testator’s wants.”); Hacker, supra note 140, at 979 (“[A] bequethal encompasses the 
giver’s preferences, decisions, and personality, as well as possibly reflecting the recipients’ grati-
tude, disappointment, remembrance, and, hopefully, respect for the giver’s choices and wishes.”). 
 207. Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask To Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a 
Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1224 (1990) 
(“[G]iving expresses love.”); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Death, Taxes and Family 
Property, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 1, 3 (1977) (noting it is argued that giving and 
bequeathing express affection). 
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friend and fellow crewmate.208 In addition to expressing positive emo-
tions through their testamentary schemes, testators can express negative 
feelings by excluding certain individuals from their estate plans, such as 
a disfavored child209 or an unloving spouse.210 Regardless of whether the 
testator’s expressed feelings are positive or negative, the expression of 
these emotions through testamentary gifts can be an act of great satisfac-
tion.211 
Another type of self-expression that is communicated through an 
estate plan and that can provide satisfaction to the testator is the opportu-
nity to shape one’s posthumous reputation. While alive, many people are 
concerned about how the public perceives them, and they derive con-
tentment from projecting a particular identity to society.212 Consequently, 
many people “employ various and sundry strategies to highlight, and 
even to edit, aspects of their identities, signaling how they wish others to 
perceive them,”213 such as wearing a certain style of clothing or driving a 
particular make of car. Similarly, the exercise of testamentary power can 
also serve as an important self-expressive tool that can shape one’s pub-
lic perception.214 Indeed, by providing for certain individuals, institu-
tions, or causes in their estate plans, testators can make one last attempt 
to mold their public perceptions.215 Just as the testator receives pleasure 
from making others happy through testamentary gifts, the act of shaping 
one’s posthumous reputation through the substance of an estate plan can 
be therapeutic for the testator. 
The creation of the Nobel Prizes by a bequest of Alfred Nobel illu-
strates how an estate plan can shape posthumous reputation and provide 
                                                            
 208. See MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 248. 
 209. See Paul T. Whitcombe, Defamation by Will: Theories and Liabilities, 27 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 749, 752 n.14 (1994) (describing a mother’s will that left a nominal sum to two daughters 
because “of their unfilial attitude toward a doting father”). 
 210. See, e.g., Brown v. Du Frey, 134 N.E.2d 469, 470–71 (N.Y. 1956) (involving a wife who 
disinherited her husband and who explained in her will that she “[did] so intentionally because of the 
fact that during [her] lifetime he abandoned [her], made no provision for [her] support, treated [her] 
with complete indifference and did not display any affection or regard for [her]”). 
 211. “When a testator bequeaths to persons, the satisfaction she derives from the trans-
fer . . . stems from what the economists, in their inimitable fashion, dub an interdependent utility 
function: Making her loved ones happy also makes the testator happy.” Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests 
For Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 52–53 (1999). In the case of disinhe-
ritance, the testator can similarly take satisfaction from making unhappy those whom he dislikes. 
 212. Id. at 53. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 53–54 (“An estate plan can serve as the final move in this social game, communicat-
ing to survivors how individuals prefer to be remembered.”). 
 215. See id. (adding that through “[b]equests to persons . . . a testator might hope to win post-
humous recognition as a devoted parent, a benevolent employer, [or] a loyal friend,” and explaining 
further that “bequests for social purposes [are] far more flexible, allowing a testator to define her 
character with precision”). 
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satisfaction to the testator. Nobel was a chemist, inventor, and manufac-
turer whose work involved various explosives, including nitroglycerine, 
a highly volatile and combustible compound.216 Inspired by the death of 
his younger brother Emil in an explosion at one of his family’s plants,217 
Nobel developed a technique of stabilizing nitroglycerine by mixing it 
with earth from the banks of a nearby river thus making the explosive 
safer to transport and use.218 Although he originally considered the name 
“Nobel’s Safety Powder,” Nobel’s invention eventually became known 
as dynamite.219 
Like the death of Emil—which contributed to Nobel’s development 
of dynamite—the loss of Nobel’s older brother Ludvig as a result of a 
heart attack provided the impetus for another of Nobel’s most notewor-
thy legacies.220 When media coverage of a death within the Nobel family 
emerged, one newspaper erroneously reported that Nobel himself had 
died and ran a highly critical obituary that described Nobel as the “mer-
chant of death.”221 Roused by this unique glimpse at his posthumous rep-
utation, Nobel aimed to reshape his public perception, and his chosen 
means to do so was through his estate plan.222 As one biographer de-
scribed, “[Nobel] became so obsessed with his posthumous reputation 
that he rewrote his last will, bequeathing most of his fortune to a cause 
upon which no future obituary writer would be able to cast asper-
sions.”223 The cause to which Nobel bequeathed not only the bulk of his 
fortune but also his family name is known as the Nobel Prizes, which 
                                                            
 216. See KENNE FANT, ALFRED NOBEL: A BIOGRAPHY 93 (1991). 
 217. See id. at 62. 
 218. See id. at 93–94. 
 219. See id. at 134. 
 220. See id. at 207. 
 221. Id.; see also ROY J. HARRIS JR., PULITZER’S GOLD: BEHIND THE PRIZE FOR PUBLIC-
SERVICE JOURNALISM 35 (2007) (“[S]ome French newspapers mistakenly reported Nobel’s demise 
after they confused him with his brother Ludvig. ‘Le Marchand de la Mort Est Mort,’ one paper 
proclaimed: ‘The Merchant of Death is Dead.’”). 
 222. See MICHAEL EVLANOFF, THE LONELIEST MILLIONAIRE 7 (1969) (“He would draw up a 
plan that would convince the nations of the world that the real Alfred Nobel cherished above all 
these three: Love, learning and compassion.”); FANT, supra note 216, at 266 (“In order to calm his 
conscience, he created his Nobel Prizes.”); RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE 
RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 87 (2010) (“[I]t was reputedly the erroneous publication of 
an obituary that prompted Alfred Nobel to establish his eponymous charitable foundation.”). 
 223. FANT, supra note 216, at 207. But see CRAIG SILVERMAN, REGRET THE ERROR: HOW 
MEDIA MISTAKES POLLUTE THE PRESS AND IMPERIL FREE SPEECH 169 (2007). Specifically, Silver-
man quoted “a senior curator at the Nobel Museum in Sweden” as saying, 
It would be interesting to find the first mention of the obituary being one reason for Al-
fred Nobel’s decision to form a Prize, but so far we have only found rather late state-
ments that this should be the case. So far we have to conclude that this is only one among 
many rumors that tend to grow around famous historical persons. 
Id. 
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annually rewards individuals who make notable contributions to the 
fields of science, literature, and world peace.224 The creation of the Nobel 
Prizes through the terms of his estate plan provided Nobel with peace of 
mind of knowing that dynamite’s devastation would not be his sole en-
during legacy.225 
Although the expressive quality of the testator’s preferred distribu-
tional scheme may be somewhat implicit, the testator’s self-expression 
can also take on a more explicit form. Specifically, testators can use the 
words of their estate-planning documents to directly express their feel-
ings and emotions.226 Like the expression of emotions through the act of 
giving, testamentary self-expression through words can relate to both 
positive and negative feelings. For example, testators who feel a particu-
lar fondness for a close friend or family member can include words of 
                                                            
 224. The Nobel Prizes, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes (last visited Oct. 4, 2011). 
 225. FANT, supra note 216, at 218 (“It must have given [Nobel] certain satisfaction to formu-
late his will the way he did.”). 
 226. Deborah S. Gordon, Reflecting on the Language of Death, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 379, 
380–81 (2011) (“Often the final significant written communication by its author, a will has the po-
tential to be a monument—or indeed a testament—to the decedent’s loved ones, to express her vi-
sion for the future or her version of the past.”). 
The will of Ludwig van Beethoven illustrates that a will can serve as a self-expressive tool. Bee-
thoven, the great German composer and pianist, feared that his worsening deafness would impede 
his musical career, and as a result of his illness, he experienced severe despair and thoughts of sui-
cide. See LEWIS LOCKWOOD, BEETHOVEN: THE MUSIC AND THE LIFE 118–21 (2005). With these 
concerns in mind, the composer traveled to the small Austrian town of Heiligenstadt in hope that 
seclusion would prove therapeutic. See ALEXANDER WHEELOCK THAYER ET AL., THAYER’S LIFE OF 
BEETHOVEN 303 (10th ed. 1991). His time there not only influenced his future compositions but also 
inspired Beethoven to draft his will. See LOCKWOOD, supra, at 121–22 (drawing connections be-
tween the Heiligenstadt Testament and Beethoven’s later work). Known as the Heiligenstadt Testa-
ment, Beethoven’s will bequeathed his entire estate to his two brothers and extensively described the 
psychological turmoil that he experienced as a result of his deafness. See TIM BLANNING, THE 
TRIUMPH OF MUSIC 99–100 (2008). 
In his will, Beethoven recalled instances in which others heard music and sounds that he could 
not, and he described the intense emotions evoked by these occurrences. As he recounted, “[W]hat a 
humiliation for me when someone standing next to me heard a flute in the distance and I heard noth-
ing or someone heard a shepherd singing and again I heard nothing.” LOCKWOOD, supra, at 119. 
Beethoven’s condition placed him on the brink of suicide, as the composer described, “Such expe-
riences brought me close to despair; a little more of that I would have been at the point of ending my 
life.” Id. Similarly passionate descriptions of Beethoven’s anguish fill the text of the Heiligenstadt 
Testament. 
Fortunately, the expression of these thoughts and feelings in his will proved therapeutic for Bee-
thoven. BARRY COOPER, BEETHOVEN 130 (2000) (“Beethoven’s decision to reject suicide and over-
come his feelings of despair by writing them down [in the Heiligenstadt Testament], can be seen as a 
turning point in his life.”); CHARLES P. MITCHELL, THE GREAT COMPOSERS PORTRAYED ON FILM, 
1913 THROUGH 2002 17 (2004) (“Simply expressing his deepest thoughts [in the Heiligenstadt Tes-
tament] had a therapeutic effect for the composer.”). As one historian described, “Beethoven’s sheer 
act of writing the Heiligenstadt Testament . . . seems to have granted its author the will to go on with 
life, turning even the defeat of deafness into a victory of will.” ALESSANDRA COMINI, THE 
CHANGING IMAGE OF BEETHOVEN: A STUDY OF MYTHMAKING 76 (2008). 
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love, affection, or gratitude in their wills.227 Conversely, testators who 
feel wronged by a family member or other acquaintance can express dis-
gust or detestation through their testamentary words.228 
The benefit that all testators can experience as a result of this form 
of testamentary self-expression is exemplified by the recent trend of es-
tate-planning practitioners and trusts-and-estates scholars recommending 
that testators include more expressive language in their estate-planning 
documents.229 For example, some scholars suggest that testators prepare 
ethical wills along with their other estate-planning documents.230 An eth-
ical will is not a legal document governing the disposition of the testa-
tor’s property.231 Instead, an ethical will is a separate document that 
serves as “a very personal form of communication” that is used “to 
share . . . values, important life lessons, wisdom, [and] family history 
with loved ones.”232 The preparation of an ethical will encourages careful 
self-reflection, including consideration of the author’s life experiences, 
                                                            
 227. See, e.g., Dykes v. Dykes, 741 S.W.2d 256, 256 (Ark. 1987) (“My children know that my 
wife and I love them dearly, and I am certain that they realize that she will dispose of any property 
of mine in a manner which is consistent with the love and affection we feel for the children.”). 
 228. Whitcombe, supra note 209, at 749. Whitcombe states, 
For hundreds of years, the dead have taken advantages of a unique and singular opportu-
nity to avenge themselves upon the living. Despite the sage advice that says “men should 
not sin in their graves,” the dead have reached out from beyond the grave to insult those 
who offended them in some way during life. 
Id. 
 229. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 226, at 381; Hacker, supra note 140, at 980. 
 230. See, e.g., David Gage et al., Holistic Estate Planning and Integrating Mediation in the 
Planning Process, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 509, 531 (2004); Zoe M. Hicks, Is Your (Ethical) 
Will In Order?, 33 ACTEC L.J. 154 (2007); Steven Keeva, A Legacy of Values, 91 A.B.A. J. 88 
(2005); Suzanna de Baca, Ethical Wills: How to Add Morals to Estate Planning, FAMILIES IN BUS., 
Nov./Dec. 2007, at 62. 
 231. See Hicks, supra note 230, at 154–55 (explaining nature and history of ethical wills). 
Specifically, Hicks noted, 
Ethical wills date back thousands of years and seem to have roots in the Bible itself. Old 
Testament patriarchs conveyed the ideals closest to their hearts, motivating values, and 
events in their life’s experiences before they passed away . . . . Although Biblical ethical 
wills were in the mode of “Now gather around, children, because I have something to tell 
you before I leave this earth,” modern ethical wills are almost always written (and occa-
sionally video-taped). Modern ethical wills are usually found in one or more letters writ-
ten to the family and kept with traditional wills. 
Id. 
 232. Lewis D. Solomon & Lewis J. Saret, Ethical Wills: Adding Values to the Estate Plan, 
D.C. EST. PLAN. COUNCIL EST. PLAN. NEWSL., Fall–Win. 2005, at 7, http://www.lewissaret.com/201 
0/03/ethical-wills-a.html; see also Hicks, supra note 230, at 154 (explaining that “[e]thical wills can 
include many things, such as the wisdom, values, and beliefs of a parent or grandparent, their pur-
poses for certain actions taken, expressions of love and affection, hopes and blessings for the family, 
exhortations to carry on charitable work, or to care for certain relatives,” and that “[t]hey can include 
reminders of heritage, expressions of gratitude, and statements of spiritual belief”). 
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morals, and beliefs, as well as relationships with friends and family,233 
and it can provide great satisfaction to the author.234 Indeed, “[e]thical 
wills help clients engage in a profoundly significant process by putting 
down what really matters to them and help give them a feeling that 
they’re doing something eminently worthwhile.”235 This form of testa-
mentary self-expression and its therapeutic effects, however, need not be 
confined to a separate ethical will, as the testator’s expressive language is 
often included in the testator’s traditional estate-planning documents.236 
In addition to the satisfaction derived directly from the act of pre-
paring an ethical will or including expressive language in other estate-
planning documents, testamentary self-expression can be therapeutic for 
the testator because the testator’s emotionally expressive statements of-
ten ease familial conflict during the administration of the estate.237 As 
discussed previously, testators may worry that their estate plans will 
cause tension between surviving family members.238 But this antithera-
peutic consequence of estate planning can be diminished by the inclusion 
of expressive language in the testator’s estate plan that explains the rea-
soning behind seemingly inequitable bequests.239 This form of self-
expression shows the testator’s careful consideration regarding estate-
planning decisions, and it can bolster respect for the testator’s wishes 
among disappointed heirs.240 Testamentary self-expression therefore has 
therapeutic potential for the testator because it can reduce the likelihood 
of familial conflict. 
                                                            
 233. BARRY K. BAINES, ETHICAL WILLS: PUTTING YOUR VALUES ON PAPER 2 (2d ed. 2006) 
(“I strongly believe that those who wish to reflect on and share life’s experiences will find an ethical 
will a useful tool.”); Gage et al., supra note 230, at 531. (explaining that in an ethical will, the testa-
tor “describe[s] the people, values, and experiences that have meant the most to them and of which 
they want their children to be aware”). 
 234. See BAINES, supra note 233, at 26–27 (explaining that “writing an ethical will adds a 
transcendent dimension to our presence on this planet by providing a link to future generations,” and 
adding that “[i]t is a way to transform values and beliefs into a legacy, which may well be accompa-
nied by a profound sense of satisfaction, completion and continuation, all at the same time”). 
 235. Keeva, supra note 230, at 88 (adding that the exercise of creating ethical wills makes the 
authors realize that “they have something to offer, namely new meaning and purpose in their lives”); 
see also MARY POLCE-LYNCH, NOTHING LEFT UNSAID: CREATING A HEALING LEGACY WITH FINAL 
WORDS AND LETTERS 26 (2006) (“When I finished writing it, I felt an incredible peace of mind 
[and] a sense of accomplishment . . . .”). 
 236. Ronald Chester, The Psychology of Dead Hand Control, 43 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
505, 505 (2008) (“This document can be separate from the will, or the language can be incorporated 
in a formal will or other document disposing of property.”); Hicks, supra note 230, at 162 (“Many 
ethical wills are woven into traditional wills.”). 
 237. See Gordon, supra note 226, at 409–10; Timothy P. O’Sullivan, Family Harmony: An All 
Too Frequent Casualty of the Estate Planning Process, 8 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 253, 308–09 
(2007). 
 238. See supra Part III.B. 
 239. See O’Sullivan, supra note 237, at 308–09. 
 240. See id. 
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Whether a testator’s self-expression is contained in an ethical will 
or a more traditional estate-planning document, testamentary self-
expression can be psychologically beneficial for the testator. “By en-
couraging testators to add greater expression—be it descriptive detail, 
explanation, narrative, or statements of individual philosophy to their 
wills—we allow those testators to define themselves, to think mindfully 
about death, and to take control of their personal legacies.”241 This op-
portunity for self-expression therefore stands alongside the freedom of 
testation,242 the role of the estate-planning attorney,243 and the ritualistic 
nature of the will-execution ceremony244 as a therapeutic aspect of the 
estate-planning process. 
V. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: MILITARY WILLS 
Once the positive and negative psychological consequences of the 
law have been identified,245 the second step of a therapeutic jurispruden-
tial analysis is to use the framework established in the first step of the 
analysis to identify ways to maximize the law’s therapeutic potential.246 
To demonstrate how this second step can be applied in the context of 
estate planning, this Part examines a particularly specialized aspect of the 
estate-planning process: the execution of wills by soldiers and sailors. 
The application of the therapeutic jurisprudential framework to the law 
governing military wills suggests that certain reforms of the law of suc-
cession would maximize the overall therapeutic potential of the law. Fur-
thermore, by illustrating the potential for therapeutic jurisprudence to 
serve as an insightful analytical tool, an analysis of the law governing the 
wills of soldiers and sailors demonstrates that the therapeutic jurispru-
dential framework should be applied to other aspects of the estate-
planning process, as well as more broadly to other areas of the law of 
succession. 
A. The Privileged Status of Military Wills 
Normally, the will-execution process can be difficult because the 
law mandates that the testator comply with various formalities to validly 
execute a will.247 In all American jurisdictions, these formalities general-
                                                            
 241. Gordon, supra note 226, at 428. 
 242. See supra Part IV.A. 
 243. See supra Part IV.B. 
 244. See supra Part IV.C. 
 245. See supra Parts III–IV. 
 246. See Schultz, supra note 30, at 54. 
 247. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 226 (warning that “these basic requirements for 
execution of wills vary considerably in detail from state to state”). 
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ly require that a will be written, signed by the testator, and attested by at 
least two witnesses.248 Other formalities are also required in some states. 
For example, some jurisdictions require that the testator and the attesting 
witnesses be in each others’ presence during the will-execution ceremo-
ny.249 Other formalities include publication, where the testator must an-
nounce to the attesting witnesses that the document before them is the 
testator’s will,250 or subscription, where the testator must sign at the end 
of the document.251 
Under certain circumstances, the law in some jurisdictions reduces 
these formal burdens for testators performing military or maritime ser-
vice.252 For example, the English Wills Act of 1837 provides that “any 
soldier being in actual military service, or any mariner or seaman being 
at sea, may dispose of his personal estate as he might have done before 
the making of this Act.”253 As this provision illustrates, the general pre-
requisite for the reduced formality of military wills is that the testator be 
in “actual military service” or “at sea.” The specifics of this requirement 
vary from state to state, with some states restricting the application of the 
provision to military personnel serving during a time of formally de-
clared war and other states construing the actual military service re-
quirement more liberally.254 
                                                            
 248. See id. 
 249. See id. at 233. 
 250. See id. at 243 n.12. 
 251. See id. at 237. 
 252. See Patricia Critchley, Privileged Wills and Testamentary Formalities: A Time to Die?, 58 
C.L.J. 49, 49 (1999); Steven F. Lancaster, Probate and the Military: What’s It All About?, 85 MIL. 
L. REV. 5, 12–13 (1979). 
 253. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Wm. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26, § 11 (Eng.). Several U.S. states have similar 
provisions. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 6 (2011) (“A soldier in actual military service or 
a mariner at sea may dispose of his personal property by a nuncupative will.”); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 551:15 (2011) (“A soldier in actual military service, or a mariner or seaman when at sea, 
may dispose of his movables and personal estate as he might heretofore have done.”); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14 § 7(a) (West 2011) (“The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a soldier in actual 
military service, or a mariner or seaman at sea, from disposing of his or her wages or other personal 
estate as he or she might otherwise have done.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-53 (West 2011) (“[A] sol-
dier being in actual military service, or a mariner or seaman being at sea, may dispose of his personal 
estate as he might heretofore have done . . . .”). 
 254. See Lancaster, supra note 252, at 13; see also Nowell D. Bamberger, Are Military Testa-
mentary Instruments Unconstitutional? Why Compliance with State Testamentary Formality Re-
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See In re Knight’s Estate, 93 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1952). But Rhode Island does not apply the privilege to 
mariners embarked as passengers on vessels traveling through a war zone en route to take command 
of another vessel. See Warren v. Harding, 2 R.I. 133 (1852). In some states, a Soldier’s will is only 
privileged if executed in fear of impending death. See, e.g., In re Hickey’s Estate, 184 N.Y.S. 399 
(Sur. Ct. 1920). But see Ray v. Wiley, 69 P. 809 (Okla. 1902). (Other states have no such require-
ment.). 
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In addition to variations regarding the actual military service re-
quirement, states differ in the extent to which the formal burdens of will 
execution are reduced for military personnel.255 Some states authorize 
oral wills for soldiers and sailors, thereby eliminating the need for the 
testator to write and sign a testamentary document.256 Other states require 
a written document but eliminate the requirement that the will be attested 
by witnesses.257 Still more variation exists in the limitations placed on the 
type and amount of property that can be distributed pursuant to the rela-
tively informal wills of soldiers and sailors.258 For example, most states 
limit the property passing via an informal military will to personal prop-
erty not exceeding a specified value.259 But at least one state permits a 
soldier to distribute an unlimited amount of both personal and real prop-
erty by the terms of an informal military will.260 
Several explanations for the reduced formality of military wills 
have been proposed.261 But the traditional rationale is that men and wom-
en on the battlefield and at sea lack the opportunity and means to comply 
with the traditionally required formalities.262 As the New York Supreme 
Court for New York County explained: 
[T]he utter inability, oftentimes, to find the time or the means to 
make a deliberate and written testamentary disposition of their ef-
fects, seem, at all times, to have made [the wills of soldiers and sai-
lors] a proper exception to the operation of a rule, which the wis-
dom of later times, has found it expedient, if not absolutely obliga-
tory, to apply to all others.263 
Thus, the law in some jurisdictions grants the wills of soldiers and sailors 
a privileged status by recognizing them as validly executed wills despite 
noncompliance with the ordinarily required formalities. 
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B. The Therapeutic Consequences of the Privileged Status 
Despite the pervasive traditional explanation of the privileged status 
of military wills, a secondary justification may also explain the relatively 
informal method of will execution provided to service personnel.264 Al-
though combat preparedness requires a proper level of morale, the ha-
zardous surroundings of the battlefield can diminish a soldier’s psycho-
logical well-being. Like Ishmael, who endured the perilous conditions 
aboard the Pequod, military personnel at war face a dangerous reality in 
which the thought of death is never far from their minds.265 The law may 
therefore provide service personnel a relatively easy method of will ex-
ecution, in part because the execution of a will can bolster morale by im-
proving the psychological state of the testator. This boost in morale may 
in turn contribute to the overall combat effectiveness of the troops.266 
This therapeutic rationale recognizes that the wills of soldiers and 
sailors enjoy a privileged status because military personnel have limited 
opportunity to reap some of the psychological benefits of the estate-
planning process. First, soldiers at war are unlikely to have access to an 
attorney who can assist them with the estate-planning process.267 Conse-
quently, an estate-planning attorney has a limited ability to serve as a 
therapeutic agent for active-military personnel.268 Second, as the tradi-
tional justification of the privileged status also recognizes, soldiers and 
sailors often lack the time and means to complete the will-execution cer-
emony.269 As a result, during the course of active service, military per-
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 268. See supra Part IV.B. 
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sonnel have a reduced opportunity to benefit from the positive psycho-
logical consequences of the will-execution ceremony.270 
Conversely, the privileged status of military wills increases the op-
portunity for military personnel to benefit from the other therapeutic con-
sequences of the estate-planning process—namely, the psychological 
benefits of testamentary freedom271 and self-expression.272 Indeed, by 
reducing the formal burdens of will execution, such as eliminating the 
need for armed-service members to locate witnesses for attestation, the 
law makes it easier for military personnel to exercise testamentary free-
dom and to express love and affection for friends and family through 
testamentary bequests. A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis therefore 
suggests that because military personnel have a diminished opportunity 
to enjoy the therapeutic consequences of consulting an estate-planning 
attorney and completing the will-execution ceremony, the law provides 
these testators with a greater opportunity to experience the psychological 
benefits of testamentary freedom and self-expression. 
C. Evaluating Reforms of the Law of Military Wills 
The therapeutic rationale of the privileged status of military wills is 
analytically valuable because it can be used to evaluate potential reforms 
of the law governing the wills of soldiers and sailors. For example, in 
recent decades, the number of states bestowing a privileged status upon 
military wills has dwindled.273 In 1979, twenty-nine states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia had laws that reduced the formal requirements of mili-
tary wills.274 But by 2008, the number of American jurisdictions granting 
this privileged status had dropped to nineteen.275 
Based on this trend, one potential widespread reform is simply to 
eliminate the privileged status, thereby mandating that the same formal 
burdens apply to the wills of both soldiers and civilians. But when ana-
lyzed from a therapeutic jurisprudential perspective, the merits of this 
reform are lacking. Because the privileged status increases the likelihood 
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that certain military personnel will experience the therapeutic conse-
quences of estate planning when they otherwise would have little oppor-
tunity to do so,276 the elimination of the privileged status reduces the 
overall therapeutic potential of the estate-planning process. Thus, a the-
rapeutic jurisprudential analysis suggests that the privileged status of 
military wills should be maintained. 
Another potential reform is to limit the application of the privileged 
status. Indeed, because several jurisdictions broadly construe the active-
military-service requirement,277 some military personnel reap the benefits 
of the privileged status despite not facing the dangers of active war, hav-
ing both access to legal assistance and ample opportunity to comply with 
the formalities of will execution.278 Therefore, one way to limit the appli-
cation of the privileged status would be to narrow the active-military-
service requirement by limiting the privileged status to the wills of testa-
tors who truly lack the opportunity and means to comply with the tradi-
tional will formalities. 
A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of this reform suggests that 
restricting the application of the privileged status would increase the 
law’s therapeutic potential. Unlike the complete elimination of the privi-
leged status, a more robust active-service requirement would maintain 
the privileged status for those testators who are unable to enjoy the the-
rapeutic consequences of completing the will-execution process. By con-
trast, military personnel who have an opportunity to comply with the tra-
ditional will formalities would be required to do so, as they would have 
the ability to reap the full psychological benefit of the will-execution 
ceremony.279 As a result, limiting the application of the privileged status 
of military wills would increase the law’s overall therapeutic potential. 
Thus, a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis suggests that maintain-
ing the privileged status of military wills and more strictly applying the 
active-service requirement would maximize the law’s therapeutic poten-
tial. But therapeutic jurisprudence does not necessarily demand that the 
law should be shaped in this way.280 Indeed, therapeutic jurisprudence 
acknowledges that a number of policy considerations should be included 
in the analysis of legal reform.281 Instead of mandating the most thera-
peutic result, therapeutic jurisprudence simply proposes that therapeutic 
considerations be evaluated alongside other policy considerations.282 
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With respect to the reform that eliminates the privileged status of 
military wills, no other policy considerations appear to have been consi-
dered by the state legislatures that adopted the reformed rules.283 In fact, 
the elimination of the privileged status has generally been part of larger 
reforms of each state’s probate code, and no careful analysis of the poli-
cy considerations underlying the privileged status of military wills seems 
to have been undertaken before such reforms were adopted.284 That is not 
to say that no legitimate policy considerations support the abolishment of 
the privileged status. In fact, proponents of reform have argued that 
modern military personnel have ample means and opportunity to execute 
formal wills and as such the privileged status is not needed.285 But poli-
cymakers in the states that have eliminated the privileged status do not 
appear to have relied upon this policy consideration when implementing 
the reform.286 
Conversely, legitimate policy considerations appear to drive the 
reform movement with respect to the narrowing of the active-service re-
quirement. For example, proponents may urge the adoption of the reform 
out of concern that a lax active-service requirement undermines the pri-
mary purpose of testamentary formality; namely, ensuring that the will 
accurately and reliably reflects the testator’s true testamentary intent. 
Indeed, if an informal will reflects testamentary intent less reliably, then 
the privileged status should be limited to those testators who will actually 
benefit from the privileged status. 
Therefore, as the analysis of both reforms illustrates, therapeutic ju-
risprudence simply suggests that therapeutic consequences should be 
considered together with other policy considerations during the legal-
reform process. In some cases, a variety of policy considerations will 
trump therapeutic concerns, but in other instances, therapeutic jurispru-
dence will illuminate the necessity for reform. 
D. Applying the Framework Beyond Military Wills 
As the analysis of the law governing the wills of soldiers and sailors 
demonstrates, the therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate plan-
ning developed in this Article can provide fresh insights into the law of 
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succession and can serve as a valuable analytical tool for evaluating pro-
posals for legal reform. But the therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of 
military wills only begins to realize the full analytical potential of thera-
peutic jurisprudence as applied to the law of succession. Indeed, the the-
rapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate planning can be used to ana-
lyze a wide array of laws that affect testators’ psychological well-being 
as they navigate the estate-planning process. 
For example, the therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate 
planning can be used to analyze the nonprobate system. In recent dec-
ades, the will’s place in the estate-planning process has diminished, and 
the prevalence of a variety of nonprobate transfers such as life insurance 
and revocable trusts has increased.287 Nonprobate transfers, however, 
generally have fewer formal requirements and typically require less legal 
assistance than traditional wills.288 But as the therapeutic jurisprudential 
framework of estate planning suggests, both the estate-planning lawyer 
and the will-execution ceremony have therapeutic qualities.289 Therefore, 
because the rise of the nonprobate system likely affects the overall thera-
peutic potential of the estate-planning process, a comprehensive thera-
peutic jurisprudential analysis of the nonprobate revolution is warranted 
and may illuminate potential areas of reform. 
Likewise, a number of other areas of estate planning raise issues for 
which therapeutic jurisprudence can serve as an important analytical tool. 
For example, in recent years, scholars have proposed either adding or 
eliminating various restrictions on testamentary freedom. Professor Terry 
Turnipseed suggests abolishing the forced spousal share,290 which tradi-
tionally provides a portion of the decedent spouse’s estate to the surviv-
ing spouse regardless of the terms of the will.291 Turnipseed therefore 
argues for the expansion of testamentary freedom. Conversely, Professor 
Deborah Batts suggests placing a new restriction on testamentary free-
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dom—namely, a forced heirship for the testator’s children.292 Whereas 
the law of wills traditionally permits testators to omit their children from 
estate plans,293 Batts argues that under certain circumstances the testa-
tor’s children should receive a mandatory portion of the estate regardless 
of the terms of the parent’s will.294 Both of these proposals raise issues 
that therapeutic jurisprudence is well-equipped to address. Indeed, be-
cause the therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate planning sug-
gests that testamentary freedom positively affects the testator’s psycho-
logical well-being,295 therapeutic jurisprudence can provide a unique 
perspective on reform proposals that either expand or restrict testamenta-
ry freedom. 
In addition to analyzing how the estate-planning process affects the 
psychological well-being of the individual testator, therapeutic jurispru-
dence can also be used to analyze other aspects of the law of succession. 
For example, the process of administering the decedent’s estate can have 
psychological consequences for the decedent’s friends and family.296 
Therapeutic jurisprudence can therefore shed light on how to alter the 
probate process so as to minimize the system’s negative psychological 
impact on the decedent’s loved ones.297 As previously discussed, one of 
the few contexts in which therapeutic jurisprudence has been explicitly 
applied to the law of succession is the proposal to implement a mediation 
process to settle estate disputes and thus positively affect the psychologi-
cal well-being of the testator’s family.298 
Finally, therapeutic jurisprudence can also be used to analyze areas 
of the law of succession that have psychological consequences that ex-
tend beyond the testator or the decedent’s friends and family. For in-
stance, the default distributional scheme of intestacy, which directs the 
estate to the decedent’s family members in the absence of a will,299 can 
have psychological consequences for broad segments of the population 
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because intestacy statutes are viewed as signaling societal approval or 
disapproval of certain relationships.300 The exclusion of some familial 
relationships, such as same-sex domestic partners, from triggering rights 
of property distribution in the absence of a will therefore stigmatizes and 
diminishes the value of these relationships.301 But the inclusion of same-
sex partnerships and other currently unrecognized familial relationships 
in the default distributional scheme of intestacy would signal societal 
approval of such relationships, and would produce positive psychological 
consequences for those involved in these relationships.302 
These examples illustrate possible applications of the therapeutic 
jurisprudential framework to the law of succession and the potential of 
therapeutic jurisprudence to serve as an insightful analytical tool. The 
therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate planning developed in 
this Article can be used to analyze a variety of estate-planning issues, 
and therapeutic jurisprudence can be applied more broadly to all areas of 
the law of succession. Indeed, because the law of succession operates 
within a variety of emotionally charged contexts, such as the estate-
planning and probate processes,303 therapeutic jurisprudence is particular-
ly equipped to aid the study of the law of succession. Until now, the re-
levance of therapeutic jurisprudence to the estate-planning process has 
largely been ignored.304 Aiming to spur widespread therapeutic jurispru-
dential analysis of the law of succession, this Article has developed a 
therapeutic jurisprudence framework of the estate-planning process and 
demonstrated therapeutic jurisprudence’s broad analytic potential. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis reveals that the estate-
planning process can be an unsettling experience because testators must 
contemplate their own mortality.305 But the analysis also suggests that 
completing an estate plan and “facing the inevitability of death . . . can 
have many psychological rewards.”306 Indeed, “the ‘estate planning’ ex-
perience is one way the client can be helped in his personal reconciliation 
to death.”307 Several aspects of the estate-planning processes contribute 
to the overall therapeutic nature of the testamentary experience, includ-
ing the doctrine of testamentary freedom, the counsel of an estate-
planning attorney, the ritualistic nature of the will-execution ceremony, 
and the opportunity for testamentary self-expression.308 
Although the therapeutic potential of estate planning seems appar-
ent, the process’s psychological consequences have largely been over-
looked. As a result, a longstanding opportunity to apply therapeutic juri-
sprudence to the estate-planning context has generally been ignored. 
Seeking to seize this opportunity and spark widespread therapeutic juri-
sprudential analysis of the law of succession, this Article has developed a 
therapeutic jurisprudential framework of the estate-planning process.309 
As the examination of the privileged status of military wills illustrates,310 
this Article’s framework can be used to analyze a broad spectrum of es-
tate-planning issues, and can ultimately provide fresh insights into the 
merits of potential legal reform in areas such as nonprobate transfers, 
testamentary freedom, estate administration, and intestacy.311 
In sum, the process of preparing and implementing an estate plan is 
potentially both unsettling and psychologically rewarding. But as this 
Article demonstrates, therapeutic jurisprudence can serve as an insightful 
analytical tool to evaluate the law of succession and to bolster the overall 
therapeutic potential of the estate-planning process. Ishmael’s experience 
of executing a will in the midst of Captain Ahab’s search for the Great 
White Whale312 exemplifies estate planning’s therapeutic potential. After 
finalizing his estate plan following a near-fatal encounter at sea, the sai-
lor described his state of mind: “I looked round me tranquilly and con-
tentedly, like a quiet ghost with a clean conscience sitting inside the bars 
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of a snug family vault.”313 After his testamentary experience, Ishmael 
was poised to face confidently the dangerous realities of his current sur-
roundings.314 Like Ishmael, all testators can receive contentment from the 
preparation and implementation of an estate plan. Legal scholars and po-
licymakers should therefore use this Article’s therapeutic jurisprudential 
framework to evaluate potential reforms of the law of succession to en-
sure that the estate-planning process is a source of comfort and satisfac-
tion for those preparing for the inevitability of death. 
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